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Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) has been introduced to fulfill the expanded need for spectrum by
different wireless networks and applications. Within the realm of spectrum access, the problem of "spectrum crunch" is present since some of the spectrum bands are overcrowded and others are underutilized.
DSA aims to alleviate the problem of spectrum crunch. In DSA, Primary Users (PUs) allow Secondary
Users (SUs) to access the spectrum as long as they do not interfere with PU transmissions beyond a
pre-agreed acceptable level. In this work, a bio-socially inspired approach is proposed for SU interactions
in support of better throughput for the whole community of SUs.
Two representative and biologically-inspired spectrum access strategies are proposed and evaluated
relative to a baseline strategy that provides anti-social random access to the underlying spectrum. A
formal analysis of the interactions among SUs is carried out using Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT).
Within the EGT, the problem is formulated as “a game against the field,” in which the replicator
dynamics is used to derive insights into the physical conditions necessary for each of the strategies
to be evolutionarily stable. This study shows that the physical channels’ conditions almost always
uniquely determine which one of the three (pure) strategies is selected, and that no mixed strategy
ever survives. Extensive ns-3 simulation and hardware testbed experiments confirm the validity of the
analytical conclusions.
The proposed strategies are applied within the Vehicular Networks (VANET) domain, and demonstrated throughput improvement for the infotainment traffic in VANETs. This study also addresses the
feasibility of employing combined social avoidance and deference behaviors among SUs for dynamic spectrum access. The employment of these behaviors in the DSA is studied using a simulation framework
and an experimental testbed.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Introduction
Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) is a new paradigm in wireless networking, wherein radio spectrum
frequencies may be assigned dynamically to remediate spectrum scarcity. Opportunistic Spectrum Access
is a prominent DSA model in which any “secondary user” (SU) is allowed to use radio spectrum already
licensed to a “primary user” (PU), as long as the PU is not subjected to interference. Opportunistic
spectrum access naturally gives rise to the concerns of spectrum sensing (see [1], [2] and others), since
its implementation requires detecting the presence of primary users[3], or equivalently, their absence, i.e.
spectrum “holes.”
Cognitive Radio (CR) is a framework of enabling technologies which facilitate the implementation
of self-configured DSA networks [4], providing for spectrum sensing, management, mobility and sharing.
Here we anticipate that the sensing technologies originally developed to coordinate PU-SU interactions
[5], might be adapted and re-appropriated within the CR paradigm, to enable more harmonious SUSU co-existence to ensure more effective resource sharing. Channel selection is an inherently complex
task in multi-channel CR networks, since each SU can (potentially) take a wide range of variables into
consideration in its channel selection strategy, including: instantaneous channel state information, social
environment, user preferences, and history. The following question is the central focus of this work:
As SU sensing capabilities advance to make more variables accessible to the channel selection strategy,
how can we reasonably expect population-level behaviors of rationally driven SUs to evolve, assuming that
spectrum utilization is the main objective of each user?
Towards resolving the question, we consider three successively more advanced spectrum users:
• Baseline: Users select their transmission channel randomly, operating in the absence of external
data about the states of the different channels.
1
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• Foraging Behavior: Users can dynamically sense the channel state information, and use this
external data to determine their channel selection and data transmission strategy.
• Social Behavior: Users can dynamically sense the channel state information as well as the properties of its co-users, and use this external data to determine their channel selection and data
transmission strategy.
Together, the strategies above represent categories of hypothetical behavioral adaptation by secondary
users, to the feasibility of more sophisticated spectrum sensing technology. The question remains as to
whether advances in sensing capability are sufficient to necessarily drive behavioral adaptation in rational
users. We will show here that this is not the case and that environmental context plays a critical role
in evolutionary outcomes. Through analysis, simulation, and hardware testbed experiments we describe
which of the three strategies (or mixture thereof) will dominate in any given environmental context. By
arriving at a complete quantitative description of the evolutionary equilibrium point in SU spectrum
access etiquette, we reveal the factors affecting the strategic decision-making of rational secondary users
with respect to opportunistic spectrum access. Knowing these factors is a necessary prerequisite to
ensuring that SU-SU co-existence benefits from advances in spectrum sensing to the maximum extent
possible long-term.
In this work, we will consider heterogeneous ecosystems containing a mix of SUs spanning the three
behavioral paradigms above. We show that, contrary to naïve expectations, more complex behavioral
paradigms are not always advantaged. We characterize the extent to which each paradigm above is
evolutionarily advantages in each of a range of spectrum environments. We describe the settings in which
behaviors like foraging and deference are likely to emerge through natural selection within DSA networks.
We demonstrate that spectrum utilization can be enhanced using the proposed bio-social behaviors within
the proposed evolutionary framework: a performance improvement of 12-116% in system throughput is
achieved.

Statement of the Problem
In the DSA paradigm, managing SU-SU interactions is crucially important. Uncoordinated SU access to resources can lead to unbalanced resource usage, and leave some channels crowded and others
underutilized.

3

Purpose of the Research
In this work, we investigate SU-SU interactions within a bio-socially inspired evolutionary framework,
to obtain long term efficient spectrum utilization strategies. In our framework, we allow SUs to adapt their
strategies gradually over time by mimicking their more successful peers. Our approach to CR societies
reflects what we know about its biological counterparts, wherein we observe a variety of individuals with
different capabilities and behaviors, adapting over time.

Significance of the Study
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and similar regulatory bodies around the world
are responsible for licensing the inherently scarce resource of radio spectrum. In spite of this, spectrum
bands are typically underutilized by their licensed owners (i.e. the “Primary Users” or PUs); indeed the
findings of Wang et al. [6] and others show spectrum occupancy in the U.S. is presently below 6%. The
FCC prompted the research community for innovative solutions to spectrum underutilization, resulting
in the development of CR and DSA models [7] which allow unlicensed SUs to access licensed spectrum
while guaranteeing transmission priority for PUs.

Research Questions
The work here raises important research questions:
1. For each possible environmental scenario (channel conditions and SUs), which strategy emerges as
dominant over time?
2. Does the community of SUs always evolve to a homogeneous system in which all SUs are using the
same strategy?
3. In which scenarios do short-term strategies (ACUs) eventually dominate? Which scenarios drive
the dominance of long-term strategies (FCUs)?
4. In which scenarios do selfish behaviors (FCUs) eventually dominate? Which scenarios drive the
dominance of altruistic social behavior (SFCUs)?
5. Which social deference structure leads the best SU interactions that enhance the spectrum utilization?

4
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Structure of the Dissertation
The overall structure of the dissertation is as follows:
• Chapter I: Introduction
• Chapter II: Paper I
• Chapter III:Paper II
• Chapter IV: Paper III
• Chapter V: Paper IV
• Chapter VI: Conclusions and future work.

Chapter 2

Evolution of Bio-Socially Inspired
Strategies in Support of Dynamic
Spectrum Access
abstract: Human and animal societies exhibit complex cognitive and social processes of coordination, cooperation, and competition among their members. Among other functions, these processes
can facilitate fairer sharing of resources among community members and enhance individual survival
outcomes. In this work, three bio-socially inspired models for secondary users of spectrum in cognitive
radio networks are defined and compared to one other within an evolutionary framework. The proposed
models reflect successively more sophisticated capabilities of secondary users in distributed spectrum
access. The simplest of the three, blind channel access, is shown to be evolutionarily dominant when
residual channel capacities are homogeneous. The second more advanced model assumes a capability to
sense channel utilization; this model is shown to dominate when the channels have intermediate load
and heterogeneous capacities. Finally, the most complex model (additionally) allows for social coalitions
and within-group deference; this model is seen to dominate in high load heterogeneous resource settings.
We explore the long term evolutionary pressures within societies whose members choose between these
three schemes, with natural selection operating via a utility-based fitness function. Our research is based
on systematic ns-3 simulation experiments of heterogeneous societies under a range of assumed channel
conditions, population sizes, resource demands, and initial user attributes. Our results demonstrate that
the secondary user population always evolves to adopt a unique and stable strategy, but that the winning strategy selected depends strongly on channel conditions. Our results further show that this kind
of leaderless evolution leads to a significant 12-116% overall improvement in performance compared to
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systems in which a fixed strategy is deployed. In summary, we conclude that evolving bio-social behavioral models can be applied to great advantage in understanding dynamic environments such as those
envisioned by distributed spectrum access.

Introduction
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and similar regulatory bodies around the world
are responsible for licensing the inherently scarce resource of radio spectrum. In spite of this, spectrum
bands are typically underutilized by their licensed owners (i.e. the “Primary Users” or PUs); indeed the
findings of Wang et al. [6] and others show spectrum occupancy in the U.S. is presently below 6%. The
FCC prompted the research community for innovative solutions to spectrum underutilization, resulting
in the development of cognitive Radio (CR) and distributed spectrum (DSA) access models [7] which
allow unlicensed “Secondary Users” (SUs) to access licensed spectrum while guaranteeing transmission
priority for PUs.
In the DSA paradigm, managing SU-SU interactions is crucially important. Uncoordinated SU access to resources can lead to unbalanced resource usage, and leave some channels crowded and others
underutilized. In this work, we investigate SU-SU interactions within a bio-socially inspired evolutionary
framework, to obtain more efficient spectrum utilization strategies long term. In our framework, we allow
SUs to adapt their strategies gradually over time by mimicing their more successful peers. Our approach
to CR societies reflects what we know about its biological counterparts, wherein we observe a variety
of individuals with different capabilities and behaviors, adapting over time. We consider three types of
SUs:
• Baseline: Users select their transmission channel randomly, operating in the absence of external
data about the states of the different channels.
• Foraging Behavior: Users can dynamically sense the channel state information, and use this
external data to determine their channel selection and data transmission strategy.
• Social Behavior: Users can dynamically sense the channel state information as well as the properties of its co-users, and use this external data to determine their channel selection and data
transmission strategy.
In this paper, we will consider heterogeneous ecosystems containing a mix of SUs spanning the three
behavioral paradigms above. We show that, contrary to naïve expectations, more complex behavioral
paradigms are not always advantaged. We characterize the extent to which each paradigm above is
evolutionarily advantages in each of a range of spectrum environments. We describe the settings in which
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behaviors like foraging and deference are likely to emerge through natural selection within DSA networks.
We demonstrate that spectrum utilization can be enhanced using the proposed bio-social behaviors within
the proposed evolutionary framework: a performance improvement of 12-116% in system throughput is
achieved.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Prior work is discussed in Section II. Section
III formally decribes the behavioral models that are considered and Section IV presents our strategy
evolution model. Simulation results are discussed in Sections V. Section VI provides conclusions of the
study and describes future research directions.

Prior Related Work
Most prior research in DSA focuses primarily on PU-SU dynamics (e.g., [5] and others), ignoring
SU-SU interactions. Exceptions are the recent work of Dixit et al. [8], Xing et al. [9] and Wisniewska et
al. [10] [11] [12][13]. Our work here also serves to elucidate the nature of SU-SU dynamics and extends
the work of Shattal et al. [14] [15]. The work utilizes the findings in the work of Dombrowski et al. [16]
for hierarchical resource sharing in the Inuit community in Labrador, Canada.
Prior research related to DSA falls broadly into three categories: (a) machine learning, (b) bio-socially
inspired, and (c) game-theoretic approaches. Previous bio-socially inspired approaches typically begin
by defining user behavioral models (e.g., preferential bias [17], peer recommendations [18] and selfishness
[19]). In our work, two elements are considered: environmental foraging and social deference.
Behavioral models based on bio-social interactions are by now well recognized as the basis of a wide
range of resource allocation problems, for MANET routing [20] and sensor network management [21]. In
the context of CR, bio-socially inspired models have been developed for spectrum sensing [21], channel
selection [22], and efficient routing [20]. Genetic algorithms have been used to tune CR parameters for
better spectrum usage [23], and recommendation systems have been applied to minimize sensing and
decision-making time required for channel selection [24].
Unfortunately, idealized bio-social models based on animal societies (e.g. termites [25], ants [26], etc.)
all assume a level of coordination of strategy choice among population members [27]. This assumption
that all members agree to follow a pre-agreed upon strategy fails to take into consideration possible
long-term evolution of strategies for users; our approach, which allows SU strategies to evolve, sidesteps
this shortcoming. Whereas almost all prior work in this area tends to compare homogeneous societies
each of which prescribe a some uniform behavior to all of its members [9], in this work we consider
heterogeneous societies in which individual behaviors can change, either due to natural selection (long
term) or rationally-driven mimicry (short term).
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Figure 1: FSM for ACU

Behavioral Models
In what follows, we assume a community of N secondary users. Each of the SUs seeks to transmit
data at a rate of R bits/s. SUs operate within an ecosystem of M spectrum channels. Each channel i (i
= 1..M ) has capacity Ci bit/s, and a fraction αi ∈ [0, 1] of the overall channel capacity that is available
for SU communications. When αi = 0, SUs are not permitted to transmit (i.e., a PU is present). When
αi = 1 all SUs who are tuned to channel i may transmit at rate R (e.g., because the PU is absent).
In this work, we will vary (i) the range of channel selection strategies used by the SU population,
and (ii) the channel characteristics, towards quantifying the impact of these two factors on (iii) actual
throughput attained by the SUs. Attained throughput will define system utility, and its maximization
will act as the fitness function driving evolutionary pressure on SU etiquette. We denote as γ(c, n, r)
the expected instantaneous fractional throughput (between 0 and 1) obtained by each SU in a homogeneous system when n SUs are simultaneously transmitting at rate r on the same channel having
capacity c. In practice, this function is dependent on the particular link layer technology and protocols
used. The function γ will play an important role in quantifying the performance of the model that follow.
We introduce three different channel selection strategies; namely: Always Consume User (ACU),
Forage-Consume User (FCU), Social Forage-Consume User (SFCU) paralleling the categories presented
in Section I. We discuss and model the details of these strategies in the following paragraphs.
The Always-Consume User (ACU) is always transmitting in some channel at this selected uniformly at random, following the Finite State Machine (FSM) in Figure 1. This simple strategy (used
previously in [28]) allows the ACU to act with a naïve view to capture utility using the set of channel
resources. The ACU’s strategy has the advantage that it can be implemented cheaply since no sensing
capability is needed. The channel selection process itself is fast, requiring minimal computational resources and no coordination overhead. In practice, an ACU may access congested channels instead of
using channels that have higher residual capacity. The performance of ACUs serves as a baseline for the
incremental benefits of more sophisticated foraging and social behaviors. In a homogeneous environment
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Figure 2: FSM for FCU
consisting of just N ACUs, the expected utility of each ACU is given by:

UACU =

M
1 X
γ(αi Ci , N/M, R)
M i=1

Advancing from ACU, the Forage-Consume User (FCU) has the ability to engage in two distinct
activities. It may either sense the channel state information but abstain from transmission (“forage”), or
it may transmit data on a channel (“consume”). The FCU’s choice to consume may, in turn, be based on
information about the channel’s state information (CSI) sensed while foraging. Interference level, noise
level, and capacity are examples of potential CSI. The FCU forgoes short-term utility benefits while in
the foraging state, but may stand to gain more long-term utility by acquiring data about the channels.
On the other hand, too much foraging could yield inefficient usage of spectrum resources and decreased
user’s utility.
As depicted in the Figure 2, an FCU is in one of two states. The FCU is in the consume state with
asymptotic relative frequency Pc ; in this state it transmits data and switches between channels with
stochastic bias proportional to its estimates of the channels’ relative capacities. The FCU is in the forage
state with asymptotic relative frequency 1 − Pc ; in this state it forages for channels by switching over
channels and sensing and collecting CSI for each channel.
In this work, FCUs consider the relative capacity of channel i as the CSI of interest:

Ci = α i C i /

X

αj Cj

j

While foraging, FCUs bias their stochastic selection of each channel proportionally to the channel’s
relative capacity (which is in turn, estimated as described above). This encourages FCUs to utilize the
channels with higher relative capacity.
Unfortunately, SUs cannot measure Ci directly for every channel i, especially in the dynamic presence
of PUs. Instead, they estimate the relative capacity of channel via the throughput recently attained on
the channel. In particular, each FCU considers its recently attained fractional throughput as a proxy
estimate for the relative capacity of its current transmission channel. Thus, if n SUs (1 ≤ n ≤ N ) are
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co-consuming channel i, each of the FCUs will estimate Ci as follows:
γ(αi Ci , n, Pc R)
Ci ≈ P
j γ(αj Cj , n, Pc R)

(1)

This estimate reflects the actual relative capacity of the channels; it is also responsive to the presence
of PUs. For example, if the users have access to 4 channels each with 1Mbps available capacity and a
PU arrives in channel 1, then α1 will change from 1 to 0, and the updated estimate (2) will reflect the
presence of the PU. The low (proxy measure of) CSI now ensures that FCUs will not switch into channel
1.
When the FCU forages it receives no utility, and when it consumes, it consumes channel i with
probability Ci In a homogeneous environment consisting of just N FCUs, the expected utility of each
FCU is thus:
UF CU = Pc

M
X

Ci γ(αi Ci , Ci N, R)

i=1

Advancing from FCU, the Social Forage-Consume User (SFCU) incorporates sociality as an
additional factor in its channel selection logic. Sociality presumes enhanced sensing capabilities beyond
the mere measurement of relative capacity levels, as it requires SUs to sense some aspect of the identities
of co-users in the channels. SFCUs may choose not to transmit in a channel because of the presence of
other users with whom a social relationship exists.
In this work, we consider a particular type of social relationship among the SFCUs; we refer to this
phenomenon as deference. Specifically, we consider the situation in which whenever a SFCU decides to
begin transmitting in a channel, the other SFCUs who are also presently transmitting in the channel tend
to defer by exhibiting a bias towards not transmitting. The SFCU behavioral model reflects well-known
findings from the structure of animal [29] and those of non-human primates [30] where sociality plays a
significant organizing function and helps towards species survival. For example, we can utilize deference
behavior in animals’ societies in order to maximize benefits for user(s) in the society which leads to less
conflict over resources.
As depicted in Figure 3, a SFCU operates using the same FSM as the FCU but with the consume state
split into Active and Defer substates. While in the consume state, the SFCU is in the Defer substate with
asymptotic relative frequency PS ; in this “social” state, the SU does not transmit or switch channels,
deferring for the benefit of other SFCUs in the DSA society. A stochastic process governed by PS allows
SFCUs in Defer state to switch to Active state. While in the Active substate with asymptotic relative
frequency 1 − PS , the SFCU transmits data at an elevated rate (1 + S+ )R to make use of the additional
bandwidth made available by deferrers and continues switching between channels with stochastic bias
proportional to its estimates of the channels’ relative capacities.
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Figure 3: FSM for SFCU
To account for the costs of coordination among the SFCUs consuming a channel, we will assume that
each gives up S− fraction of its utility towards coordination overhead. In a homogeneous environment
consisting of just N SFCUs, the expected utility of each SFCU is thus:

USF CU = Pc

M
X

Ci (1 + S+ )R · (1 − S− ) · γ(αi Ci , Ci N, R)

i=1

Heterogeneous systems. In what follows, we will assume a heterogeneous ecosystem consisting of
a total of N = NACU + NF CU + NSF CU secondary users, of which NACU are ACUs, NF CU are FCUs,
and NSF CU are SFCUs. The expected number of SUs of each type consuming in each channel i is then
given by:

nACU

=

NACU
M

nF CU

=

Ci NF CU

nSF CU

=

Ci · (1 − PS ) · NSF CU

Note that when the ACUs and FCUs transmit they do so at rate R, whereas when the SFCUs transmit
they do so at the elevated rate (1 + S+ )R. Thus, we are considering a heterogeneous environment where
there are two types of users in channel with capacity c = αi Ci : There are n1 = nACU + nF CU users of
type 1 transmitting at a rate r1 = R and n2 = nSF CU users of type 2 transmitting at r2 = (1 + S+ )R.
We introduce two functions capture the expected instantaneous fractional throughput (between 0 and
1) obtained by each SU in a heterogeneous system; γ1 (c, n1 , r1 , n2 , r2 ) is the fractional throughput
obtained by users of type 1 (i.e. ACU/FCUs), while γ2 is what is obtained by type 2 users (i.e. SFCUs)
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in such a setting. The quantity

Xi,t = γt (αi Ci , nACU + nF CU , R, nSF CU , (1 + S+ )R)

then represents the instantaneous fractional throughput of SUs of type t in channel i (where t = 1, 2).
The expected utility obtained by each of the three types of users is then expressible as follows:

UACU

=

M
1 X
R · Xi,1
M i=1

UF CU

=

Pc

M
X

(2)

Ci · R · Xi,1

(3)

Ci · (1 + S+ )R · (1 − S− )Xi,2

(4)

i=1

USF CU

=

Pc

M
X
i=1

and the total expected utility achieved in such a system is the sum of the utility of all users in the
system:
US = NACU · UACU + NF CU · UF CU + NSF CU · USF CU

Strategy Evolution
Based on the formal model description and analysis of expected utilities in the previous section, we
see that utility achieved by an SU is a function of its strategy, the available channel capacity, the numbers
of co-users of each type in the channel, and their transmission rates. For fixed settings, each SU receive
some computable utility based on these factors, as specified by equations (2), (3), and (4).
We now extend the model to allow SUs to evolve over time by changing their strategy. For example,
an ACU might choose to change and become an FCU, or vice versa. An SFCU might become an ACU
briefly, and then later return to behaving like an SFCU1 . We justify the extended model by appealing to
the long term phenomenon of natural selection and the short term phenomenon of mimicry. In the biosocial sphere, long term natural selection processes are driven through fitness and reproductive viability.
In the cognitive radio context, we anticipate an analogous fitness function to be implemented through
free market dynamics. We also anticipate that the more sophisticated SUs of the future may attempt to
imitate one another’s strategies if they are determined to be superior; in nature this is the phenomenon
of mimicry.
In our simulations of strategy evolution, we make some simplifying assumptions: (1) strategy
1 Each SU employs one and only one strategy (i.e., ACU, FCU, or SFCU) at each point in time, in a community of
heterogeneous population (i.e., a community of SUs in which the nodes utilize dissimilar pure strategies). No SU ever
employs a "mixed strategy" in the game-theoretic sense.
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Table 1: Simulation Parameters
Parameter
Total number of SUs
Number of Channels
Channel capacity (Mbps)
Modulation Scheme
WLAN Standard
Distance from AP
Transmission power
Channel Propagation Model
CBR transmission
rate per SU (kbps)

Value
80
4
hom.: [1,1,1,1] and het.:[1, 1, 11, 11]
DSSS
IEEE 802.11g
10m
16.0206 dBm (default) [31]
Log Distance Propagation Model [32]
10 Kbps (light), 40 Kbps (intermediate)
60 Kbps (heavy)

evolution takes place only at the end of discrete “phases”; (2) at the end of each phase, users truthfully
share information about the throughput they attained during the phase; (3) we allow only a small
randomly chosen set of SUs to change their strategy at the end of discrete phases. Assumption (1) is
inconsequential to our conclusions, and made mainly so that (3) can be easily implemented; assumption
(3) is made so as to observe the diffusion of successful strategies and prevent thrashing. In practice,
assumption (2) incurs some coordination costs, but in this work, we ignore this constant overhead and
focus on the performance impact of strategy evolution.
The work here raises important research questions:
1. For each possible environmental scenario (channel conditions and SUs), which strategy emerges as
dominant over time?
2. Does the community of SUs always evolve to a homogenous system in which all SUs are using the
same strategy?
3. In which scenarios do short-term strategies (ACUs) eventually dominate? Which scenarios drive
the dominance of long-term strategies (FCUs)?
4. In which scenarios do selfish behaviors (FCUs) eventually dominate? Which scenarios drive the
dominance of altruistic social behavior (SFCUs)?

Simulation Experiments
In our simulations, we consider a range of CR scenarios. Throughout, we assume 4 channels and 80
SUs. We always start with 20 SUs per channel, with 80% of the SUs being of one type, and 10% of
each of the other two types. Channel capacities are taken to be either homogeneous with all channels
having capacity 1 Mbps, or heterogeneous with two channels having capacity 1 Mbps and two having
capacity 11 Mbps. We take the traffic load to be either light, where each SUs transmits at either a light
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Figure 4: Channel Switching and Strategy Evolution of SUs
rate (R = 10 Kbps) or intermediate rate (R = 40 Kbps), or a heavy rate (R = 60 Kbps). The total
offered traffic thus ranges from light (20x10 = 200Kbps) to heavy (20x40=800Kbps). The simulation
parameters are listed in Table 7. Network nodes, representing SUs, are distributed around the Access
Point (AP) on a circle of a 10m radius. This eliminates the effect of variability of the distance between
AP and SUs on the SUs’ throughput. A standard log-distance channel propagation model is used [32].
Every node transmits to a pre-determined node via the AP. For simplicity, mobility is not considered in
our simulations. While the IEEE 802.11g WLAN standard is used at the MAC layer for our simulation
experiments, other MAC layer protocols could be utilized.
Each simulation experiment is broken into phases; namely, channel switching and strategy evolution
(c.f. Figure 4). Each phase is broken into iterations where the duration of each iteration is 10 seconds of
simulation clock time. Within a channel switching phase, each SU operates by switching channels and
transmitting data according to the logic of its chosen strategy, as described in the previous sections. At
the end of each iteration, we tabulate the total throughput within each channel; this data is used as a
proxy measurement for the CSI (residual channel bandwidth) during the next iteration. In addition, we
aggregate the average utility achieved by each of three SU types (ACU, FCU, SFCU) in the previous
iteration. Prior to the start of next iteration, a small number of randomly selected SUs are permitted
to use the aggregated data as the basis for changing strategies; in our simulation, this small set of
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“evolving” SUs choose a strategy which outperformed their current strategy in the previous phase. In
this way, SUs use their communal experiences within phases to learn about the strategy better suited
to the spectrum environment scenario. As we shall see, depending on the initial channel conditions and
population demographics, different strategies emerge as dominant over long (multi-phase) timescales.

Results
We describe 3 × 3 = 9 different scenarios covering all the possibilities in which one of the 3 strategies
(ACU, FCU, SFCU) was dominant at the beginning, and one was eventually dominant post-evolution.
These experiments are illustrated in TABLE 8. The column represents the initially dominant strategy in
each scenario, while the row represents the final dominant strategy. Each cell of the table is labelled by
its environmental parameters (above) and an informal description (below). Together the 9 experiments
show that (A) the specific winning strategy that emerges as the eventual winner in the evolutionary
process is determined by the environmental parameters; (B) more sophisticated strategies are not always
preferred; (C) in each case, the population evolves to a homogeneous configuration in which all SUs
employ the same strategy. Most significantly, (D) strategy evolution yields a significant improvement in
the aggregate throughput of the overall system, as illustrated in the Figure 5.
The results of these simulation experiments as summarized in the following paragraphs, answering
Research Questions 1 and 2:
The ACU strategy outperforms the other strategies in scenarios that involve channels with homogeneous capacities under light load; see
Table 8 (a-c). In these scenatios, the ACU strategy outperforms the other strategies because of
foraging and sociality incur unnecessary overhead that negatively impacts system utility.
The FCU strategy outperforms the other strategies in scenarios that involve channels with heterogenous capacities under intermediate load; see Table 8 (d-f). In such scenarios, employing the foraging
behavior is advantageous (relative to ACUs) because it allows the SUs to find and use better channels.
Social behavior is not advantageous because deference does not yield significant advantage in light load
scenarios.
The SFCU strategy outperforms other strategies in scenarios that involve channels with heterogenous
capacities under high load; see Table 8 (g-i). Allowing all SFCUs to transmit in such scenarios negatively
impacts the utility for the overall system. By engaging in social deference behavior, only a PS fraction
of the SFCUs transmit (at a higher rate), while the remaining defer—this yields higher system utility.
Long-term versus Short-term: The FCU strategy outperforms the ACU strategy when the channel
capacities are heterogeneous and under intermediate load; the conclusion is reversed when channel capacities are homogeneous and under light load—see Table 8 (b) and (e). This answers research question
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Table 2: Simulation Results: Evaluation of ACU, FCU, SFCU Strategies Under Various Channel
Conditions
Homogeneous channels, Light load
Ps : 0.5, Pc : 0.98, S− : 0.6, S+ : 0.0

(a) ACU initially dominant, ACU eventual winner.

Homogeneous channels, Light load
Ps : 0.5, Pc : 0.5, S− : 0.6, S+ : 0.0

b) FCU initially dominant, ACU eventual winner.

Homogeneous channels, Light load
Ps : 0.6, Pc : 0.6, S− : 0.5, S+ : 0.0
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(c) SFCU initially dominant, ACU eventual winner.

Heterogeneous channels, Intermediate load
Ps : 0.7, Pc : 0.98, S− : 0.7, S+ : 0.0

(d) ACU initially dominant, FCU eventual winner.

Heterogeneous channels, Intermediate load
Ps : 0.7, Pc : 0.98, S− : 0.7, S+ : 0.0

(e) FCU initially dominant, FCU eventual winner

Heterogeneous channels, Intermediate load
Ps : 0.5, Pc : 0.98, S− : 0.7, S+ : 0.0
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(f) SFCU initially dominant, FCU eventual winner.

Heterogeneous channels, Heavy load
Ps : 0.2, Pc : 0.96, S− : 0.03, S+ : 0.27

(g) ACU initially dominant, SFCU eventual winner

Heterogeneous channels, Heavy load
Ps : 0.2, Pc : 0.93, S− : 0.03, S+ : 0.2

(h) FCU initially dominant, SFCU eventual winner.

Heterogeneous channels, Heavy load
Ps : 0.1, Pc : 0.97, S− : 0.05, S+ : 0.27
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Figure 5: Throughput improvement due to strategy evolution
(i) SFCU initially dominant, SFCU eventual winner.

3 as to when short-term strategies (ACUs) dominate versus long-term strategies (FCUs).
Altruism versus Selfishness: The SFCU strategy outperforms the FCU strategy when the channel
capacities are heterogeneous and under heavy load; the conclusion is reversed when channel capacities
are homogeneous and under lighter load—see Table 8 (h) and (f). This answers research question 4 as
to when selfish strategies (FCUs) dominate versus altruistic social strategies (SFCUs).

Conclusions and Future Work
In this work we presented three bio-socially inspired strategies for DSA by secondary users. We
demonstrated through simulation experiments that each of these strategies has the potential to dominate the others over long time scales where natural selection is at play. We showed that the winning
strategy depends on the underlying channel conditions and the demographics of the SUs. ACUs emerge
when the channel capacities are homogeneous and under light load; FCUs emerge when the channels
capacities are heterogeneous and under intermediate load; SFCUs emerge when the channels capacities
are heterogeneous and under heavy load.
In our future research work, we plan to replicate the experimental results of this paper formally using
evolutionary game theory. We also plan to verify the conclusions in a experimental hardware testbed in
which some of the simplifying assumptions of the simulation models are no longer present.

21

Acknowledgment
This project was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation program for Enhancing
Access to Radio Spectrum (#1443985 and #1638618), supported by the MPS, ENG and CISE Directorates. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Science Foundation.

Chapter 3

Evolutionary Game Theory
Perspective on Dynamic Spectrum
Access Etiquette
abstract: In this work, we describe the long-term evolution of societies of secondary users in dynamic spectrum access networks. Such an understanding is important to help us anticipate future trends
in the organization of large-scale distributed networked deployments. Such deployments are expected
to arise in support of a wide variety of applications including vehicular networks and the Internet of
Things. Two new biologically-inspired spectrum access strategies are presented here, and compared with
a random access baseline strategy. The proposed strategies embody a range of plausible assumptions
concerning the sensing capabilities and social characteristics of individual secondary users. Considering
these strategies as the basis of “a game against the field,” we use replicator dynamics within an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis to derive insights into the physical conditions necessary for each of the
strategies to be evolutionarily stable. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that the physical channel conditions
almost always uniquely determine which one of the three (pure) strategies is selected, and that no mixed
strategy ever survives. We show that social tendencies naturally become advantageous for secondary
users as they find themselves situated in network environments with heterogeneous channel resources.
Hardware testbed experiments confirm the validity of the analytic conclusions. Taken together, these
results predict the emergence of social behavior in the spectrum access etiquette of secondary users as
cognitive radio technology continues to advance and improve. The experimental results show an increase
in the throughput of up to 90%, when strategy evolution is continuously operational, compared to any
static strategy. We present use cases to envision the potential application of the proposed evolutionary
22
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framework in real-world scenarios.

Introduction
Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) is a new paradigm in wireless networking, wherein radio spectrum
frequencies may be assigned dynamically to remediate spectrum scarcity. Opportunistic Spectrum Access
is a prominent DSA model in which any “secondary user” (SU) is allowed to use radio spectrum already
licensed to a “primary user” (PU), as long as the PU is not subjected to interference. Opportunistic
spectrum access naturally gives rise to the concerns of spectrum sensing (see [33], [2] and others), since
its implementation requires detecting the presence of primary users [34], or equivalently, their absence,
i.e. spectrum “holes.”
Cognitive Radio (CR) is a framework of enabling technologies which facilitate the implementation of
self-configured DSA networks [4], providing for spectrum sensing, management, mobility, and sharing.
Here we anticipate that the sensing technologies originally developed to coordinate PU-SU interactions
[5], might be adapted and re-appropriated within the CR paradigm, to enable more harmonious SU-SU
co-existence, thus ensuring more effective resource sharing. Channel selection is an inherently complex
task in multi-channel CR networks, since each SU can (potentially) take a wide range of variables into
consideration in its channel selection strategy, including: instantaneous Channel State Information (CSI),
social environment, user preferences, and history. The following question is the central focus of this work:
As SU sensing capabilities advance to make more variables accessible to the channel selection strategy,
how can we reasonably expect population-level behaviors of rationally driven SUs to evolve, assuming that
spectrum utilization is the main objective of each user?
Towards resolving the question, we consider three successively more advanced spectrum users:
• “Primitive” users who are not capable of sensing channel characteristics, or responding to them
behaviorally.
• “Foraging” users who are capable of sensing channel characteristics, and can respond behaviorally
by either consuming (transmitting) or foraging for (listening) resources;
• “Social” users who are additionally capable of sensing the identities of co-users within their environment, and can respond by deferring to them (or not).
Through analysis and experimental studies, we describe which of the three strategies (or mixture
thereof) dominates in any given environmental context. By arriving at a complete quantitative description
of the evolutionary equilibrium point in SU spectrum access etiquette, we reveal the factors affecting
the strategic decision-making of rational secondary users with respect to opportunistic spectrum access.
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Knowing these factors is a necessary prerequisite to ensuring that SU-SU co-existence benefits from
advances in spectrum sensing to the maximum extent possible long-term.
We demonstrate that spectrum utilization can be enhanced using the above bio-social behaviors
within an evolutionary framework. The experimental results indicates an increase in the throughput of
up to 90% when evolution is continuously operational, compared to when any one strategy is statically
deployed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Prior work is discussed in Section 5. Section III
introduces the behavioral models and the utility functions being maximized. Section IV presents several
use cases for the devised strategies. The results of formal analysis and experimental based studies of
system dynamics are presented in Sections 5, and 5, respectively. Finally, conclusions and future research
directions are discussed in Section 5.

Prior Related Work
Most prior research in cognitive radio focuses primarily on PU-SU dynamics (e.g. [5] and others),
ignoring SU-SU interactions. Exceptions are the recent work of Dixit et al. [8] and Xing et al. [9]
as well as that of Wisniewska et al. [35] [10] [11] [12][13]. Our work serves to address the nature of
SUs dynamics and expands the work of Shattal et al. [14] [15]. The work utilizes the outcome of
the work of Dombrowski et al. [16] for resource sharing in the Inuit community in Labrador, Canada.
Research into PU-SU and SU-SU interactions can be classified in three broad categories: (a) machine
learning formulations, (b) biologically or socially inspired schemes, and (c) game-theoretic approaches.
The results presented here serve to address the research gap emanating from the aucity of studies that
address the role of SU interactions in support of enhanced DSA. This research gap is illustrated in Figure
18 relative to the different DSA/CR-related research areas addressed in the recent literature.
Machine learning approaches have been applied extensively to spectrum sharing [36], spectrum
sensing [37] and channel selection [38]. Specifically, different types of machine learning algorithms have
been incorporated into CR network protocols (see [39] for a survey), including support vector machines
[40], re-enforcement learning [41] and Q-Learning [42]. Unfortunately, in machine learning approaches
it is difficult to provide the SU with the correct action that is best for the current situation, especially
for DSA systems in dynamic environments. This problem can be seen, for example, in reinforcement
learning approaches where decision making depends on a trial and error process with evaluative feedback
[43].
Biologically or socially inspired approaches typically begin by incorporating a social component
to users’ behavioral models (e.g., preferential bias [17], peer recommendations [18], and selfishness [19]).
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Figure 6: Taxonomy of DSA problems and approaches.
These approaches consider the CR ecosystem as a social network [44] [45] for which cooperative schemes
are designed [22]. Such approaches recognize the optimization inherent in evolving biological systems,
and seek to apply the outcomes of biological natural selection processes to the realm of CR networks.
Behavioral models based on animal social interactions are by now well recognized as the basis of a wide
range of resource allocation problems, including MANET routing [46], Vehicular Network (VANET)
routing [47], and sensor network management [21]. In the context of CR, bio-socially inspired models
have been developed for spectrum sensing [21], channel selection [22], and efficient routing [46]. Genetic
algorithms have been used to tune CR parameters for better spectrum usage [23], and recommendation
systems have been applied to minimize sensing and decision-making times required for channel selection
[24]. Unfortunately, idealized bio-social models based on animal societies (e.g., termites [48], ants [26],
etc.) require a level of coordination among population individuals [27]. The assumption of pre-agreed
upon coordination fails to take into consideration possible long-term evolution of strategies for users.
Our approach, which allows SU strategies to evolve, sidesteps this shortcoming.
Game theory approaches have been used as a mathematical framework for scenario-based analysis
and modeling of CR networks (see [49] and [50] for a survey of prior work in this area). Competition
among SUs over network resources has been modeled as a non-cooperative game [51]. Unfortunately,
most game-theoretic research relies on the availability of spectrum statistics in order to formulate the
game and cope with spectrum dynamic changes, especially in stochastic [52] and repeated games [53].
Such information is not known a priori, limiting the applicability of this approach [54].
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) has captured the attention of researchers in DSA because of its
impressive ability to model potential PU-SU dynamics as an evolving game [55]. In some cases, evolutionary stable strategies have been found to exhibit in-simulation performance improvements of almost
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(a) FSM for ACU

(b) FSM for FCU

(c) FSM for SFU

Figure 7: Finite State Machine for the proposed bio-social users.
35% [37]. EGT is also attractive because it relaxes the traditional rationality assumptions of game theory [56], which require all players to have complete knowledge of the game. Yet another advantage of
EGT is that its framework of replicator dynamics can provide computable rates of convergence to an
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS), and thus generate concrete predictions of the distribution of the
deployed strategies and a picture of the adaptation of users over time. Despite the fact that “uncoordinated” access to the spectrum by SUs would likely result in poor long-term spectrum utilization, SU
interactions have not been studied thoroughly in the literature. One exception, however, is the work of
Jiang et al. [2] which studied the SUs’ spectrum access jointly with spectrum sensing based on EGT.
In this work, we apply EGT to the DSA/CR domain to shed light on what we can reasonably expect
to witness as SU etiquette in the long-term. We focus on the emergence of bio-socially inspired foraging
and socializing behaviors, and the potential impacts of these behaviors on the overall performance of the
system as measured by spectrum utilization.
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Behavioral Models
In what follows, we assume a community of N SUs. Each SU seeks to transmit data at a rate of
R bits/s. SUs operate within an ecosystem of M spectrum channels. Each channel i (i = 1..M ) has
capacity Ci bit/s, and a fraction αi ∈ [0, 1] of the overall channel capacity that is available for SU
communications. When αi = 0, SUs are not permitted to transmit (i.e., a PU is present); when αi = 1,
all SUs who are tuned to channel i may transmit at rate R (e.g., because the PU is absent). While Ci
depends on the channel conditions including noise and interference, αi only depends on the presence of
the PU, and defined as follows:

αi =



 0

; RP Ui > 0


 1

; RP Ui = 0

where RP Ui is the PU transmission rate on the channel i.
In this work, we will vary (i) the range of channel selection strategies used by the SU population,
and (ii) the channel characteristics, towards quantifying the impact of these two factors on (iii) actual
throughput attained by the SUs. Attained throughput will define the system’s utility, and its maximization will act as the fitness function driving evolutionary pressure on SU etiquette.
We introduce three different channel selection strategies, namely: Always Consume User (ACU),
Forage-Consume User (FCU), Social Forage-Consume User (SFU).
The Always-Consume User (ACU) is always transmitting on some channel that is selected
uniformly at random, following the Finite State Machine (FSM) in Figure 19-(a). This simple strategy
(used previously in [28]) allows the ACU to act with a naïve view to capture utility using the set of
channel resources. The ACU’s strategy has the advantage that it can be implemented cheaply since no
sensing capability is needed. The channel selection process itself is fast, requiring minimal computational
resources and no coordination overhead. In practice, an ACU may access congested channels instead of
using channels that have higher residual capacity. The performance of ACUs serves as a baseline for the
incremental benefits of more sophisticated foraging and social behaviors.
Advancing from the ACU, the Forage-Consume User (FCU) has the ability to engage in two
distinct activities. It may either sense the CSI (“forage") but abstain from transmission, or it may
transmit data on a channel (“consume"). The FCU’s choice to consume may, in turn, be based on
information about the CSI sensed while foraging. Interference level, noise level, and capacity are examples
of potential CSI1 . The FCU forgoes short-term utility benefits while in the foraging state, but may stand
1 In this work, we do not focus on contributions toward the problem of spectrum sensing, but rather assume that an FCU
has access to “sufficient” information about the channel at the moment of decision-making. In our analysis, simulation
and hardware experiments (described in later sections), the FCU has access to basic CSI on noise and interference levels),
implemented as channel sniffing spectrum sensing at the MAC layer.
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to gain more long-term utility by acquiring information about the channels. On the other hand, too
much foraging could yield inefficient usage of spectrum resources and decreased utility. As depicted
in Figure 19-(b), an FCU is in one of two states. The FCU is in the consume state with asymptotic
relative frequency Pc . In this state, it transmits data and switches between channels with stochastic
bias proportional to its estimates of the channels’ relative capacities. The FCU is in forage state with
asymptotic relative frequency 1 − Pc . In this state, it only collects CSI as it switches across all channels.
Based on the CSI, each FCU establishes preferential access to specific channels.
In this work, FCUs consider the relative capacity of channel i as the CSI of interest:

Ci = α i C i /

X

αj Cj

(1)

j

where j = 1, 2, . . . , M . While foraging, FCUs bias their stochastic selection of each channel proportionally
to the channel’s relative capacity. This behavior encourages FCUs to utilize channels with higher relative
capacities.
Unfortunately, SUs cannot measure Ci directly (especially in the dynamic presence of PUs). To
circumvent this obstacle, here we allowed SUs to estimate the relative capacity of the channel via the
throughput recently attained within it. The throughput Rth can be drawn from the Shannon’s formula:

Rth = B · (1 + Pk

y=1

Gz Pz
Gzy Py + W

)

where k is the number of co-consumers (i.e., interferers) in the channel i, the transmission power of
SU z (resp. y) are denoted Pz (resp. Py ); B is the channel bandwidth; Gz is the channel gain for
transmissions by z, Gzy represents the channel gain for the transmission between z and y, and W is the
power level of the ambient white Gaussian noise. Each FCU considers its recently attained fractional
throughput γ(αi Ci , ni , Pc R) reflected from Rth as a “learned” proxy estimate for the capacity of its
current transmission channel. Thus, if ni SUs (1 ≤ ni ≤ N ) are co-consuming channel i, the FCUs
estimate the relative channel capacity Ci as follows:
γ(αi Ci , ni , Pc R)
Ci ≈ P
j γ(αj Cj , nj , Pc R)

(2)

where j = 1, 2, . . . , M . This estimate reflects the actual relative capacity of the channels. It is also
responsive to the presence of PUs. For example, if the users have access to 4 channels each with 1Mbps
available capacity and a PU arrives in channel 1, then α1 drops from 1 to 0, and the updated estimate
(2) reflects the presence of a PU. The low (proxy measure of) CSI now ensures that FCUs will not switch
to channel 1. When the FCU forages, it receives no utility, and when it consumes, it consumes channel
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i with probability Ci .
Advancing from FCU, the Social Forage-Consume User (SFU) incorporates sociality as an additional factor in its channel selection logic. Sociality presumes enhanced sensing capabilities beyond the
mere measurement of relative capacity levels, as it requires SUs to sense some aspect of the identities
of co-users in the channels. SFUs may choose not to transmit on a channel because of the presence of
other users with whom a social relationship exists.
In this work, we consider a particular type of social relationship among the SFUs. We refer to this
phenomenon as deference. Specifically, we consider the situation in which whenever a SFU decides to
begin transmitting on a channel, the other SFUs who are also presently transmitting on the channel tend
to defer by exhibiting a bias towards not transmitting. The SFU behavioral model reflects well-known
findings from the structure of animal [29] and non-human primate [30] societies. In these societies,
sociality plays a significant organizing function and helps ensure species survival. In our work, the social
deference behavior witnessed in animal societies is leveraged to yield benefits for secondary users in terms
of reduced conflict over resources.
As depicted in Figure 19-(c), a SFU operates using the same FSM as the FCU but with the consume
state split into Active and Defer substates. While in the consume state, the SFU is in the Defer substate
with asymptotic relative frequency Ps . In this “social” state, the SU does not transmit or switch channels,
deferring for the benefit of other SFUs in the DSA society. A stochastic process governed by Ps allows
SFUs in Defer state to switch to Active state. While in the Active substate with asymptotic relative
frequency 1 − Ps , the SFU transmits data at an elevated rate (1 + S+ )R. This increase helps in using
the additional bandwidth that has been relinquished by deferrers. S+ ∈ [0, 1] is the percentage that
represents this increase in the rate. Each SFU continues switching between channels with stochastic bias
proportional to its estimates of the channels’ relative capacities.
To account for the costs of coordination among the SFUs consuming a channel, we will assume
that each gives up S− fraction of its utility towards coordination overhead. S− ∝ c0 N h : h ∈ [1, 2]
represents the social penalty due to coordination overhead among SFUs to access the channel. S−
increases proportionally with the number of SFUs (i.e., N ). h is an exponent that represents the degree to
which SFUs coordinate their social attributes. For full coordination among social users h = 2 (i.e., N xN
coordination among SFUs). S− is protocol-specific coordination overhead with some constant c0 . The S−
factor encompasses the effect of the sociality coordination overhead. The exact coordination overhead is
scenario specific (network architecture, network protocol and standard, and channel assignment scheme).
This factor is impacted by the nature of the coordination and cooperation among SFUs. For example,
if the interaction comprises of a prioritized access among the SFUs, the overhead will be different than
for schemes where all SFUs have the same priority to access the channels.
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In the next sub-sections, we discuss the utility of SUs utilizing the proposed strategies in two different
systems, namely: homogeneous and heterogeneous. In homogeneous systems, all SUs utilize the same
strategy. In heterogeneous systems, different SUs utilize different strategies. In both cases, the utility is
presented for single and multi-channel systems. These utilities will be the basis for our analysis (Section
5) and experimental studies (Section 5).

Utility of the SUs in Homogeneous Systems
Consider a homogeneous system S in which there are N SUs of ACUs, FCUs, or SFUs, acting on one
channel of capacity C and the SUs transmit at a rate of R. Such a system is specified by a 3-tuple

Z = (C, N, R)

The fractional throughput of the SUs in Z is written as:

Xη (Z) := η(αC, N, R)

Where η(αC, N, R) denotes the expected instantaneous fractional throughput (between 0 and 1)
obtained by each SU in a homogeneous system when N SUs are simultaneously transmitting at rate
R on the same channel having α of the overall capacity C available for SU communications. In practice,
this function is dependent on the particular link layer technology and protocols used. The function η
plays an important role in quantifying the performance of the model that follows.
Now, when we consider a system Z ∗

Z ∗ = (C, N, R)

(3)

having access to M > 1 channels of capacities C1 , . . . CM . Assuming Z ∗ is in steady state, Osi represents
the expected number of SUs employing strategy s on channel i. Therefore, the occupancy of the SUs
employing the ACU, FCU, and SFU strategies on channel i can be represented as follows:

i
OACU

=

N
M

(4)

OFi CU

=

Ci · N

(5)

i
OSF
U

=

Ci · (1 − PS ) · N

(6)
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The total demand for channel i is computable as

Di (Z ∗ , s) = Osi · R

(7)

and the fractional throughput of users in channel i is:

Xηi (Z ∗ , s) = η(αi Ci , Osi , R)

(8)

While the precise form of η is intractable, we will take

Xηi (Z ∗ , s) ≈



 1



if Di (Z ∗ , s) < ρCi
1

∗
expDi (Z ,s)−ρCi

(9)

if Di (Z ∗ , s) ≥ ρCi

Here ρ is a fitting parameter chosen so that η mirrors experimental measurements. In a homogeneous
environment consisting of N ACUs, the expected utility of each ACU is given by:

Us=ACU (Z ∗ ) =

M
1 X
R · Xηi (Z ∗ , s)
M i=1

(10)

In a homogeneous environment consisting of N FCUs, the expected utility of each FCU is thus:

Us=F CU (Z ∗ ) = Pc

M
X

Ci · R · Xηi (Z ∗ , s)

(11)

i=1

In a homogeneous environment consisting of N SFUs, the expected utility of each SFU is thus:

Us=SF U (Z ∗ ) = Pc

M
X

Ci (1 + S+ ) · R · (1 − S− ) · Xηi (Z ∗ , s)

(12)

i=1

Utility of the SUs in Heterogeneous Systems
In heterogeneous systems, each SU chooses one strategy to employ, although different SUs may make
different choices. Consider a heterogeneous system S in which there are k1 ACUs, k2 FCUs, ad k3 SFUs.
In S, there is just one channel of capacity C and the ACUs and the FCUs transmit at a rate of r1 while
SFUs transmit at a rate of r2 . Such a system is specified by a 5-tuple

S = (k1 , k2 , k3 , r1 , r2 )

(13)
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The fractional throughput of the SUs in S is written as:

Xγ (S) := γ(αC, k1 + k2 , r1 , k3 , r2 )

(14)

Considering a multi-channel system S ∗ , we have:

S ∗ = (k1 , k2 , k3 , r1 , r2 )

(15)

having access to M > 1 channels of capacities C1 , . . . CM . In what follows, S ∗ will always consist of
a set of SUs who each follow a pure strategy. We will, however, sometimes subject the system to the
possibility that some fraction of its players could “mutate” to different (possibly mixed) strategy.
Assuming S ∗ is in steady state, the expected number of ACUs, FCUs and SFUs in channel i is given
by
NACU
M

i
OACU

=

OFi CU

= Ci NF CU

(17)

i
OSF
U

= Ci (1 − PS )NSF U

(18)

(16)

The total demand for channel i is computable as

i
i
Di (S ∗ ) = (OACU
+ OFi CU ) · R + OSF
U · (1 + S+ ) · R

(19)

and the fractional throughput of users in channel i is:

Xγi (S ∗ )

=

i
γ(αi Ci , OACU

+

i
OFi CU , R, OSF
U , (1

+

S+ )

·

R)

(20)

While the precise form of γ is intractable (as in the γ in the homogeneous system), we will take

Xγi (S ∗ ) ≈



 1



if Di (S ∗ ) < ρCi
1

∗
expDi (S )−ρCi

(21)

if Di (S ∗ ) ≥ ρCi

Here ρ is a fitting parameter chosen so that γ mirrors experimental measurements. In system (S ∗ ), the
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utility achieved by each ACU, FCU, and SFU, respectively is:
M
1 X
R · Xγi (S ∗ )
M i=1

UACU (S ∗ )

=

UF CU (S ∗ )

= Pc

M
X

(22)

Ci · R · Xγi (S ∗ )

(23)

Ci · R · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ )

(24)

i=1

USF U (S ∗ )

= Pc

M
X
i=1

where Gs = (1 + S+ ) · (1 − S− ) is the sociality gain. The system utility is expressed as:

US (S ∗ ) = NACU · UACU (S ∗ )
+ NF CU · UF CU (S ∗ ) + NSF U · USF U (S ∗ ) (25)

When an individual user gains more utility due to channel switching or strategy evolution, the system’s
utility US (S ∗ ) increases accordingly. The system utility is a measure of how SUs are acting on the system
and provide us with a basis of judgment for the long term benefits of strategies in the system. Formal
performance analysis is provided in section 5, in which limits and conditions for each SU strategy to
maximize the system utility are established.

Use Cases and Applications
In this section, two real-world scenarios are introduced to address the applicability of the proposed
strategies.

Internet-of-Things: Electronic Health Services
Electronic Health Services (EHS) is an application in the Internet-of-Things (IoT) domain, in which
vital data is transmitted and processed to advance human health. In this application, wireless sensors are
connected to the patients to sense and transmit vital data (i.e., heart rate, blood pressure, etc.). These
sensors transmit data to the nursing stations to be monitored and reviewed for fast recommendations
and quick response.
In cases where the number of the patients is large, spectrum access becomes a critical aspect of
system since delayed or dropped packets affect the availability of the data for medical staff. This issue
is particularly important in unlicensed bands where spectrum is also simultaneously accessed by other
networks (e.g., WiFi, Bluetooth, etc.) that are outside the control of the EHS system. Leveraging
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foraging behaviors and social interactions between secondary users (EHS sensors) can potentially yield
throughput gains for the overall EHS system. In short, DSA approaches can provide a flexible selfconfiguring solution for devices to utilize in multichannel unlicensed bands.

Considering the proposed DSA strategies, we anticipate the following three cases, for potential benefits
for EHS applications:
Case 1 - Potential benefits from ACU strategies: This strategy potentially provides better performance
when the traffic demand from EHS sensors is low. It represents a primitive candidate strategy for channels
with lower contention levels. However, this strategy fails to benefit from channels with better conditions,
in the cases where channels have different contention levels. The implementation of this strategy is cost
effective since it does not require sensing, and requires minimal computation resources to randomize the
channel access.
Case 2 - Potential benefits from FCU strategies: In this strategy, sensors transmit traffic intelligently
on channels that have fewer co-users by actively sensing the channels characteristics. An effective implementation of this strategy’s must specify an appropriate balance between the time used for sensing
and the time used for transmission. This strategy needs more computation and network resources to
implement the decision making and channel sensing processes compared to the ACU strategy.
Case 3 - Potential benefits from SFU strategies: SFUs have potential advantage when devices are able
to socialize within groups in a hierarchical or prioritized manner. Sensors could be potentially classified
into groups based on their traffic demand. Sensitive data might be transmitted with higher priority and
SFUs might form deference hierarchies to coordinate and prioritize their transmissions. An effective use
of this strategy’s must address the trade-off between the overhead of social coordination, channel sensing,
and the gain from the social deference.

Infotainment Traffic throughput: Internet of Vehicles
Our approach can be potentially applied to VANETs, where vehicles communicate over channels that
are rapidly changing in terms of the number of SUs. The load is completely generated by SUs (vehicles)
since VANETs utilize Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) service and control channels,
and (unlike in the EHS setting) do not coexist with other networks. In this application, we optimize the
throughput of infotainment traffic. The interplay between infotainment and safety traffic in VANETs
ensures that optimizing the throughput of infotainment traffic will yield greater (residual) bandwidth to
support safety traffic.
Considering the proposed DSA strategies, we can anticipate the following three cases:
Case 1 - Potential benefits from the ACU strategy: If the infotainment traffic is evenly distributed
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across the service channels, the ACU strategy provides fast channel access with minimal decision making
overhead. The cost of implementing this strategy is low, similar to the cost of its deployment in the EHS
use case.
Case 2 - Potential benefits from the FCU strategy: Applying the FCU strategy helps the SUs to
access the service channels that have less contention on average to enhance the overall throughout of the
system. The cost of implementing this strategy is similar to the cost of the FCU strategy discussed in
Case 2 of the EHS use case.
Case 3 - Potential benefits from the SFU strategy: Applying the grouping and socializing primitives
of the SFU strategy, we can provide different groups of users with prioritized access to the channels. This
is especially important in cases where channels are heavily loaded, and deference among vehicles can lead
to better channel utilization in favor of the infotainment and safety traffic. The cost of implementing
this strategy is similar to the cost of the SFU strategy discussed in Case 3 of the EHS use case.

Formal Performance Analysis
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) originated as an application of game theory in the context of biological sciences [57], based on the understanding that frequency dependent fitness introduces a strategic
aspect to evolution. Within EGT, population games consider the behavior of populations of strategically
interacting players. There are two types of population games, “pairwise" games and “games against the
field."
In pairwise games, each player is assumed to play against a random player in the population and the
overall utility is determined based on statistical analysis of the utility of players in the population. The
individual utility obtained by the user is calculated based on the game structure.
Mynard in [58] describes advantages of “games against the field" over pairwise games. In the former
game, the player plays against the whole population or against a subsection of it. Unlike pairwise games,
the field approach does not require complete knowledge about the structure of the game. Rather, it relies
on the accumulation of empirical information about the relative advantages of individual pure strategies.
This idea was first put forth by Nash in [59], and has since been described in many textbooks (e.g., see
[60]).
In general game theory, Nash equilibrium is an optimal outcome of the game such that no player
gains more utility by unilaterally deviating “or changing” his strategy, under the assumption that other
player(s) strategies remain unchanged. When the game is in Nash equilibrium, all players reach their
maximum utilities and have no incentive to deviate from their strategies. The ESS is thus a strategy
that, once employed by the whole population, renders impossible for any other strategy to spontaneously
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arise. If the whole population employs the ESS then the population is, by definition, at Nash equilibrium.
EGT analysis of the proposed system is motivated by the fact that each user in the system is competing
simultaneously over the channels against all other users. The assumptions of pair-wise games are not
realistic, since these games assume that the player plays against an individual opponent. By making the
assumption that only a small number of users evolve to employ a better strategy over time, we can thus
analyze our system using the framework of evolutionary game theory.
We follow the standard formal definitions of the ESS [61]. A strategy σ ∗ is an ESS, if mutants that
adopt any other strategy σ leave fewer offsprings in the post-entry population x := (1 − )σ ∗ + σ,
assuming that the proportion of mutants  is sufficiently small (0 <  < ). For σ ∗ to be ESS then:

U (σ ∗ , x ) > U (σ, x )

(26)

where U (σ ∗ , x ) is the payoff (utility) of players that play σ ∗ and U (σ, x ) is the payoff of the mutants
that play σ in the post-entry population, respectively.
In what follows, we define U (S ∗ ; s, x ) as the utility received by users employing strategy s in a system
S ∗ of a mixed population that utilizes multiple strategies. For convenience, U (S ∗ ; s, x ) is denoted as
Us (S ∗ ). The stability of the strategy, when it exists, is guaranteed only when the number of users
deviating from strategy s is sufficiently small.

Existence of ESS—the general framework
In this section, we describe the conditions in which a homogeneous system of SUs is an ESS—that is,
invasion by any competing mixed strategy will fail, provided the invading population is sufficiently small.
We will first state a general formulation of conditions for an ESS in the lemma below. This lemma will
be specialized and applied to homogeneous systems of ACUs, FCUs, and SFUs in the next section. The
next definition is helpful in the results that follow.
Definition 1. Let S ∗ be the system in (3), and σ ∗ = (p∗ , q ∗ , k ∗ ) and σ = (p, q, k) are mixed strategies
where ACU, FCU, SFU are used with probabilities p∗ , q ∗ , k ∗ , for σ ∗ and p, q, k, for σ, respectively;
where (p∗ + q ∗ + k ∗ = 1) and (p + q + k = 1). Define

A(S ∗ , σ ∗ , σ) = p∗ (p∗ − p) · UACU (S ∗ ) + q ∗ (q ∗ − q) · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k ∗ (k ∗ − k) · USF U (S ∗ ) (27)

B(S ∗ , σ ∗ , σ) = (p∗ − p)2 · UACU (S ∗ ) + (q ∗ − q)2 · UF CU (S ∗ ) + (k ∗ − k)2 · USF U (S ∗ ) (28)
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Lemma 1. Let S ∗ be the system in (3), and suppose that the majority 1− of SUs employ σ ∗ = (p∗ , q ∗ , k ∗ )
where the ACU, FCU, SFU strategies are used with probabilities p∗ , q ∗ , k ∗ , respectively. When a small
 fraction of SUs contemplate a defection to a mixed strategy σ = (p, q, k) where ACU, FCU, and SFU
strategies are used with probabilities p, q, k, respectively, then for  sufficiently small, the defection fails
to be rational. In particular, S ∗ is evolutionarily stable as long as

<

A(S ∗ , σ)
B(S ∗ , σ)

(29)

Proof. Since  ≈ 0 the payoff for a defecting player is:

Uσ (S ∗ ) = p · UACU (S ∗ ) + q · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k · USF U (S ∗ )

(30)

The existence of an ESS in an EGT game requires the inequality condition of Equation (2) to hold.
Suppose σ ∗ = (p∗ , q ∗ , k ∗ ) is the strategy employed in S ∗ and σ = (p, q, k) is the strategy of the defectors.
The utility achieved by the defectors is

Uσ = p [p∗ − (p∗ − p)] · UACU (S ∗ ) + q [q ∗ − (q ∗ − q)] · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k [k ∗ − (k ∗ − k)] · USF U (S ∗ ) (31)

while the non-defectors achieve

Uσ∗ = p∗ [p∗ − (p∗ − p)] · UACU (S ∗ ) + q ∗ [q ∗ − (q ∗ − q)] · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k ∗ [k ∗ − (k ∗ − k)] · USF U (S ∗ )
(32)
It is easy to check that Uσ∗ > Uσ if and only if  < A/B.

Existence of ESS
Since we have three pure strategies and one mixed strategy, we need the following five propositions
to study the existence of ESS:
Proposition 1. If S ∗ is a homogeneous system of ACUs, a defection to strategy σ = (p, q, k) by an 
fraction of players fails to be rational if  is less than

(1 −

p)2

(1 − p) · UACU (S ∗ )
· UACU (S ∗ ) + q 2 · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k 2 · USF U (S ∗ )
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Proof. Using Lemma 2, we specialize Definition 2 to the situation σ ∗ = (1, 0, 0) to obtain

A(S ∗ , σ) = (1 − p) · UACU (S ∗ )

B(S ∗ , σ)

=

(1 − p)2

· UACU (S ∗ ) + q 2

· UF CU (S ∗ ) + k 2

(33)

· USF U (S ∗ ) (34)

The proposition is proved.
As UACU (S ∗ ) decreases, we see that the bound on  in Proposition 6 approaches 0, making it more
likely that users will defect away from the homogeneous ACU society. Conversely, as UACU (S ∗ ) increases
relative to UF CU (S ∗ ) and USF U (S ∗ ), we see that the bound on  approaches 1, making it so users will
be unable to defect away from the homogeneous ACU society without group coordination.
Proposition 2. If S ∗ is a homogeneous system of FCUs, a defection to strategy σ = (p, q, k) by an 
fraction of players fails to be rational if  is less than
(1 − q) · UF CU (S ∗ )
p2 · UACU (S ∗ ) + (1 − q)2 · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k 2 · USF U (S ∗ )
Proof. Using Lemma 2, we specialize Definition 2 to the situation σ ∗ = (0, 1, 0) to obtain

A(S ∗ , σ) = (1 − q) · UF CU (S ∗ )

B(S ∗ , σ)

=

· UACU (S ∗ ) + (1 − q)2

p2

· UF CU (S ∗ ) + k 2

(35)

· USF U (S ∗ ) (36)

The proposition is proved.
As UF CU (S ∗ ) decreases, we see that the bound on  in Proposition 7 approaches 0, making it more
likely that users will defect away from the homogeneous FCU society. Conversely, as UF CU (S ∗ ) increases
relative to UACU (S ∗ ) and USF U (S ∗ ), we see that the bound on  approaches 1, making it so users will
be unable to defect away from the homogeneous FCU society without group coordination.
Proposition 3. If S ∗ is a homogeneous system of SFUs, a defection to strategy σ = (p, q, k) by an 
fraction of players fails to be rational if  is less than
(1 − k) · USF U (S ∗ )
p2 · UACU (S ∗ ) + q 2 · UF CU (S ∗ ) + (1 − k)2 · USF U (S ∗ )
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Proof. Using Lemma 2, we specialize Definition 2 to the situation σ ∗ = (0, 0, 1) to obtain

A(S ∗ , σ)

B(S ∗ , σ)

=

p2

=

· UACU (S ∗ ) + q 2

(1 − k) · USF U (S ∗ )

· UF CU (S ∗ ) + (1 − k)2

(37)

· USF U (S ∗ ) (38)

The proposition is proved.
As USF U (S ∗ ) decreases, we see that the bound on  in Proposition 7 approaches 0, making it more
likely that users will defect away from the homogeneous SFU society. Conversely, as USF U (S ∗ ) increases
relative to UACU (S ∗ ) and UF CU (S ∗ ), we see that the bound on  approaches 1, making it so users will
be unable to defect away from the homogeneous SFU society without group coordination.
Proposition 4. If S ∗ is a system in which

UACU (S ∗ ) = UF CU (S ∗ ) = USF U (S ∗ )
then no evolutionary stable strategy exists in S ∗ .
Proof. If all utilities of all strategies are equal then players may switch and mix strategies without
penalty, and because the strict inequality in (2) cannot be made to hold for any strategy, no strategy is
evolutionarily stable.

Proposition 5. If S ∗ is a system in which UACU (S ∗ ), UF CU (S ∗ ) and USF U (S ∗ ) are pairwise distinct,
and σ is evolutionary stable strategy in S ∗ , then σ is a pure strategy.
Proof. Suppose σ is the ESS. The payoff for this strategy is

Uσ (S ∗ ) = p · UACU (S ∗ ) + q · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k · USF U (S ∗ )

This function is convex combination, and so is maximized by placing all the probability mass on the
unique strategy which has the highest utility. Thus, precisely one of the values p, q, k is equal to 1.

Corollary 1. If S ∗ is a system in which UACU (S ∗ ), UF CU (S ∗ ) and USF U (S ∗ ) are pairwise distinct, and
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σ is evolutionary stable strategy in S ∗ , then



ACU



σ=
FCU




 SFU

if UACU (S ∗ ) > UF CU (S ∗ ), USF U (S ∗ )
if UF CU (S ∗ ) > UACU (S ∗ ), USF U (S ∗ )

(39)

if USF U (S ∗ ) > UACU (S ∗ ), UF CU (S ∗ )

Finding an ESS
Theorem 1. For a system S ∗ where Xγi (S ∗ ) ≈ 1, ACU is a winning strategy iff: Pc < min(1, G1s ).
Proof. Corollary 2 mandates that UACU (S ∗ ) > UF CU (S ∗ ) and UACU (S ∗ ) > USF U (S ∗ ), which implies:

Substituting Xγi (S ∗ ) = 1 and

M
1 X i ∗
X (S ) >
M i=1 γ

Pc

M
1 X i ∗
X (S ) >
M i=1 γ

Pc

PM

i=1

M
X

Ci · Xγi (S ∗ )

(40)

Ci · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ )

(41)

i=1
M
X
i=1

Ci = 1, we get

Pc

<

1

(42)

Pc · Gs

<

1

(43)

The theorem is proved.
Theorem 2. For a system S ∗ , where

∀i, j : 1 . . . M, Ci = Cj

ACU is a winning strategy iff: Pc < min(1, G1s ).
Proof. Since Ci = Cj for all i, j it follows that

Ci = Cj = 1/M

Substituting into inequalities (8) and (9), we get

The theorem is proved.

Pc

<

1

(44)

Pc · Gs

<

1

(45)
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Reflections on Theorems (5) and (6): The antecedent in Theorem (5) means that all channels
are able to accommodate the demand, and thus, from the nodes’ perspective, their demand is fulfilled
regardless of their channel choices. The ACUs benefit directly from this condition as they randomly access
the channels. The SFUs and FCUs detect this condition using their foraging capability, but to gain this
knowledge, they sacrifice some of their channel access time by foraging some fraction (Pf = 1 − Pc ) of
the time. This behavior hinders their ability to gain utility relative to the ACUs. On the other hand,
SFUs can recapture some of this loss by the advantage derived from social behavior (Gs ). As long as
the effects of foraging and social gain are less than 1; however, the SFUs cannot outperform the ACUs
under this condition. The antecedent in Theorem (6), states that the utilities of all channels are equal
but not necessarily equals 1. This happens when the different channels provide similar throughput;
this uniformity implies that the utility lost due to time spent foraging was in vain since it yielded no
information about the channel environment; leading to the same conclusion as that of Theorem (5).
Theorem 3. For a system S ∗ , FCU is a winning strategy iff:

Pc >

PM
∗
i
1
i=1 Xγ (S )
PM
M i=1 Ci · Xγi (S ∗ )

(46)

and
Gs < 1

(47)

Proof. Corollary 2 mandates that UF CU (S ∗ ) > UACU (S ∗ ) and UF CU (S ∗ ) > USF U (S ∗ ), which implies:

Pc

M
X

Ci · Xγi (S ∗ ) >

M
1 X i ∗
X (S )
M i=1 γ

Ci · Xγi (S ∗ ) >

Pc

i=1

Pc

M
X
i=1

M
X

Ci · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ )

(48)

(49)

i=1

Rearranging the terms of the two inequalities, the theorem is proved.
Reflections on Theorem 7: The antecedent in Theorem (7) asserts a lower-bound on the probability of consuming, that is the ratio of the ACU and FCU utilities, and indicate that the social gain is
smaller than 1. We know already from Theorems (5) and (6), that the ACUs outperform all strategies
when channels have uniform conditions. In non-uniform settings, the FCUs and SFUs have the tendency
to access channels with better throughput, based on the values of Ci . In non-uniform channel settings,
the weighted average in the denominator is greater than the unweighted average in the numerator, and
so the ratio of the ACU to the FCU utilities decreases below 1; the lower bound on Pc then drops correspondingly, and (for appropriately chosen Pc < 1) foraging wins. The second antecedent lower-bounds
the sociality gain (Gs ) to be less than 1. This condition restricts the SFUs from compensating for their
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social coordination overhead and ensures that FCUs outperform SFUs.
Theorem 4. For a system S ∗ , SFU is a winning strategy iff:

Pc >

PM
i
∗
1
i=1 Xγ (S )
P
i
∗
M M
i=1 Ci · Gs · Xγ (S )

(50)

and
Gs > 1

(51)

Proof. Corollary 2 mandates that UF CU (S ∗ ) > UACU (S ∗ ) and UF CU (S ∗ ) > USF U (S ∗ ), which implies:

Pc

M
X

Ci · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ ) >

M
1 X i ∗
X (S )
M i=1 γ

Ci · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ ) >

Pc

i=1

Pc

M
X
i=1

M
X

Ci · Xγi (S ∗ )

(52)

(53)

i=1

Rearranging terms of the two inequalities, the theorem is proved.
Reflections on Theorem 8: The antecedent in Theorem (8) asserts a lower-bound the probability
of consume, that is the ratio of the ACU and the SFU utilities, and prescribe a sociality gain greater than
1. We know already from Theorems (5) and (6), that the ACUs outperform all strategies when channels
have uniform conditions. In non-uniform settings, the FCUs and the SFUs have the tendency to access
channels with better throughput, based on the values of Ci . In non-uniform channel settings, the weighted
average in the denominator is greater than the unweighted average in the numerator, and so the ratio of
the ACU to the SFU utilities decreases below 1; the lower bound on Pc then drops correspondingly, and
(for appropriately chosen Pc < 1) foraging wins. The second antecedent lower-bounds the sociality gain
(Gs ) to be greater than 1. This condition allows the SFUs to benefit from their social coordination and
ensures that SFUs outperform FCUs.

Replicator Dynamics and Rate of Convergence
The Nash equilibrium doesn’t describe the evolution process of the population to reach equilibrium,
especially in games with multiple equilibria [62]. On the other hand, the replicator dynamics details the
evolution mechanisms through which the population arrives at an ESS. Following the general equation
for replicator dynamics, we define xi as the portion of the population playing strategy i and fi (x) as the
fitness of strategy i:
ẋ = xi [fi (x) −

n
X
j

xj · fi (x)]

(54)
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where ẋ represents the rate of change of x per unit time. In order to study the rate of convergence to an
ESS, we define c1 , c2 and c3 as follows:

c1

=

[UACU

·

(1

−

xACU )

−

UF CU

·

xF CU

−

USF U

·

xSF U ] (55)

c2

=

[UF CU

·

(1

−

xF CU )

−

UACU

·

xACU

−

USF U

·

xSF U ] (56)

c3

=

[USF U

·

(1

−

xSF U )

−

UACU

·

xACU

−

UF CU

·

xF CU ] (57)

The replicator dynamics of the ACU, FCU, and SFU strategies is represented as:

ẋACU = c1 · xACU

(58)

ẋF CU = c2 · xF CU

(59)

ẋSF U = c3 · xSF U

(60)

xACU = xACU (0)ec1 t

(61)

xF CU = xF CU (0)ec2 t

(62)

xSF U = xSF U (0)ec3 t

(63)

Solving for xACU , xF CU and xSF U yields:

The number of users in the community is constant, and hence:

xACU + xF CU + xSF U = 1

(64)

NACU
NF CU
NSF U
+
+
=1
N
N
N

(65)

implying that:

at any point of time.
This implies that users leaving one strategy will be captured by another strategy in the system. The
rate of convergence differs based on the values of c1 , c2 and c3 . That means the time needed for every
strategy to evolve in the system depends on the deviation of population from this strategy. This evolution
converges exponentially; therefore, making the system stable to temporal changes.
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Figure 8: Experimental Testbed.

Discussions
We can conclude the following based on the analytical results presented in this work:
Similar vs. dissimilar channels’ capacities: For channels with dissimilar capacities, the FCU and SFU
strategies perform better than the ACU strategy, under proper forage and social tendencies. This is due
the fact that the ACU strategy suffers from degraded throughput over crowded channels, while the FCU
and SFU strategies balance their losses among channels based on their relative capacities. For channels
with similar capacities, the ACU strategy outperforms as it does not have the overhead associated with
foraging and social coordination as that of the FCU and SFU strategies.
Mixed strategies vs. pure strategies: The utility of a mixed strategy is the weighted sum of the utilities
of the three constituent strategies. A given SU can play a mixed strategy to maximize its benefit. Since
the sum of probabilities for the three strategies equals 1, the maximum utility is obtained when a player
maximizes the weight that corresponds to the maximum utility. By maximizing this probability, the
mixed strategy changes to be closer to the pure strategy that has the maximum utility. Furthermore, no
combination maximizes the utility if one of the strategies is better than others as described in Proposition
5. If the utilities of all strategies are equal, there is no ESS in the system since the user can arbitrary
choose different strategies that achieve the same utility.
Replicator dynamics: The rate of convergence of the population towards the ESS strategy is important
to quantify the time needed for the population to reach an ESS. This rate depends on the relative fitness
of the strategies.
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Table 3: Experimental Parameters
Parameter
Total number of SUs
Number of Channels
PU traffic (Mbps)
WLAN Standard
WLAN channel capacity
Distance from AP
Transmission power
Channel Propagation Model
CBR transmission
rate per SU (kbps)

Value
80
4
Homogeneous:[1, 1, 1, 1]
Heterogeneous:[19, 19, .25, .25]
IEEE 802.11g
ns-3 network: 11Mbps
Physical network: 54Mbps
10m for ns-3 network
16.0206 dBm (default) [31]
Log Distance Propagation Model [32]
10 Kbps (light), 40 Kbps (intermediate)
65 Kbps (heavy)

Experimental Results
In this section, a testbed is presented to experiment with channel switching and strategy evolution
in Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). The testbed design and implementation are described next,
followed by experimental results and discussions.

Experimental Testbed
For experimental purposes, a testbed was developed; its architecture is shown in Figure 26. Five
Small-Form Factor Singe-Board Computers (SBCs) are setup with Ubuntu Linux. The SBCs are UDOO
devices with ARM i.MX6 NXP® processor. Each SBC is equipped with a Netgear-N150 Wireless-N USB
adapter, enabled with Atheros device driver. ns-3 is installed on two SBCs to transmit and receive SUs
traffic. The ns-3 network in these two SBCs runs as a WLAN 802.11g network: network nodes (SUs) are
uniformly distributed around an Access Point (AP) on a circle with 10m radius, eliminating the impact of
distance on the SUs’ throughput variability. A standard log-distance channel propagation model is used
[32]. System parameters are listed in Table 7. At the same time, a second pair of SBCs are dedicated for
emulating the behavior of primary users. To experiment with channels that have different capacities, PU
traffic is generated on the channel using the iperf tool in Linux and the back-off algorithm is turned
off on the WiFi devices so that PUs have priority over the SUs to access the channels. This behavior is
realized by changing the register values in the ModWiFi [63] device driver and verified experimentally (see
Table 4). Finally, a 5th SBC represents the node manager that controls the experiments and monitors
the traffic over the physical channel using wireshark.
Each experiment is split into two phases: (1) channel switching and (2) strategy evolution (see Figure
9). Each phase, in turn, is divided into iterations, and the duration of each iteration is 60 seconds. Within
a channel switching phase, each SU operates by switching channels, transmitting data, and following its
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strategy. At the end of each iteration, the total throughput within each physical channel is tabulated;
this data is used as a proxy measurement for the CSI, and is then used to inform strategy selection for
the next iteration.
In this work, the channel estimation is sent to the SUs in centralized fashion. The node manager
collects the channels estimations and send it to the SUs. In general, the SUs can implement both types of
sensing, namely: channel sensing: to obtain channel capacity and social sensing: to obtain the identities
of co-users, in a distributed or centralized fashion. Only SFUs exchange and coordinate information (as
part of their social functions) to implement the deference behavior. ACUs and FCUs act independently
and FCUs obtain their own channels estimates, without exchanging information with other SUs.
In our experiments, we consider a range of CR scenarios. Throughout, we assume a network of 80
SUs sharing 4 channels (each with 11 Mbps channel capacity) in ns-3 real-time mode. We always start
with 20 SUs on each ns-3 channel, with 80% of the SUs being of one type, and 10% of each of the other
two types. After each iteration is completed the node manager reports CSI to all SUs so they can update
their channel selection probabilities as well as for strategy evolution decisions.
In some experiments, residual channel capacities are taken to be homogeneous: all channels having the
PUs transmitting at 1 Mbps. In other experiments, channels are assumed heterogeneous: two channels
have the PUs transmitting at 19 Mbps and two having the PUs transmitting at 0.25 Mbps. We take the
SUs’ load to be either light: each SU transmits at a rate of R = 10 Kbps, moderate R = 40 Kbps, or
heavy R = 65 Kbps. The total offered traffic thus ranges from 200 Kbps to 1300 Kbps.
Figure 16 illustrates the steps followed in each iteration. These steps are detailed in the following
paragraphs:
1. The experiment starts by preparing the configuration for nodes in the setup phase (see Figure 16).
The node manager sends commands to the PU-Rx node to be ready for receiving data from the
PU-Tx node.
2. The node manager sends commands to the PU-Tx node to start transmission using the iperf tool
with a pre-defined transmission rate. The PU data transmission is initiated first to ensure that the
channel is loaded with PU traffic prior to SU transmissions on the channel.
3. The node manager sends commands to the SU-Rx and SU-Tx nodes to start receiving and transmitting data, respectively.
4. For SU traffic, UDP packets from the SU-Tx node are passed from the ns-3 network through the
tap-bridge device to the WiFi device on the UDOO SBC.
5. Packets are then transmitted over the air on the physical WLAN channel, under the presence of
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Table 4: Results of a Single Iteration
Channel
Number
1
2
3
4

PU’s demand
(Theoritical)
(Mbps)
20
20
0.5
0.5

PU’s throughput
(Experimental)
(Mbps)
20.00
19.70
0.497
0.497

SU throughput per user
ACU, FCU, SFU
(Kbps)
0.073, 0.034, 0.103
0.047, 0.021, 0.239
17.70, 24.88, 42.97
14.91, 22.66, 34.58

the PU traffic.
6. In the corresponding SU-Rx node, packets that received by WiFi devices are passed to the ns-3
SU-Rx node through the tap-bridge.
7. Throughput counters are used to calculate the throughput for data flows.
8. Throughput values for different SUs are sent to the node manager in order to make channel switching and strategy evolution decisions.
9. The node manager waits for the results and checks the connectivity among the PU and SU devices
and saves the results used for the next experiment.
10. The node manager receives CSI details (i.e., throughput) from the SU-Rx node.
11. Prior to starting the next iteration, a small number of randomly selected SUs are permitted to
use the aggregated data as the basis for changing strategies; in our experiments, this small set of
“evolving” SUs choose a strategy which outperformed their current strategy in the previous phase.
Consequently, SUs use their communal experiences within phases to learn about the strategy that
is better suited to the given DSA scenario.
If no system utility enhancement is achieved and the SUs strategies stable for 5 iterations, the system
is considered as converged and the experiment is terminated.
A result of one iteration is shown in Table 4. These results are associated with the results in Table
5-Figure (g). It can be clearly seen that the PUs obtained the required throughput, while the SUs (ACUs,
FCUs, and SFUs) obtained throughput based on the remaining capacity during the PU transmissions.

Results
We describe 3 × 3 = 9 different scenarios covering all the possibilities in which one of the 3 strategies
(ACU, FCU, SFU) is dominant at the beginning, and another is eventually dominant post-evolution.
These experiments are illustrated in Table 5. Each column represents the initially dominant strategy in
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Figure 9: Channel switching and strategy evolution of SUs.
each of the scenarios, while the row represents the final dominant strategy. Each cell of the table is labeled
by its environmental parameters (above) and an informal description (below). The 9 experiments show
that (A) the specific winning strategy that emerges as the eventual winner in the evolutionary process is
determined by the environmental parameters; (B) more sophisticated strategies are not always preferred;
(C) in each case, the population evolves to a homogeneous configuration in which all SUs employ the
same strategy. Most significantly, (D) strategy evolution yields a significant improvement in the aggregate
throughput of the overall system, as illustrated in the Figure 11. Running the experiment with different
values for media access eagerness (reflected in Pc ), social preferences (captured by Ps ), and channel
characteristics (i.e. PU traffic assumptions) results in different evolution patterns. While PU traffic
affects all three strategies, Pc only mediates the performance of FCU and SFU strategies.
To assess the efficacy of the ACU strategy, we conducted 3 experiments using the experimental channel
and strategy parameters detailed in Table 7 and in the headers above each of the figures in Table 5-Figure
(a)-(c). In these scenarios, all channels were lightly loaded with PUs (0.25M bps). In these experiments,
the ACUs are uniformly distributed over the channels. The FCU and SFU strive to maximize their utility
by accessing better channels more often. Hence, all strategies end up distributing their users equally
over the channels. Since the FCUs and SFUs have less probability to transmit over the channel due to
their probability of foraging 1 − Pc = 0.1, the utilities of the FCUs and SFUs decrease and the ACU
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Figure 10: Timeline of actions during each experiment.
strategy dominates the community. In our experiments, the ACU baseline strategy showed (2.6 − 21.3%)
improvement over other strategies as shown in Figure 11-Columns (a)-(c). The SFU strategy utility
decreased in the community since the probability of deference is high (i.e., Ps = 0.9). The ACU strategy
still had the potential to be the winning strategy since ACUs transmit on all channels while the FCU
and SFU transmissions are decreased due to their foraging behavior.
To assess the efficacy of the FCU strategy, we conducted 3 experiments using the experimental channel
and strategy parameters detailed in Table 7 and in the headers above each of the figures in Table 5-Figure
(d)-(f). In these scenarios, two channels were highly loaded with PUs (19M bps), and two channels were
lightly loaded (250kbps). In these scenarios, the ACU strategy does not adapt to the channel conditions
since ACUs are distributed quasi equally over channels. In contrast, the FCUs and SFUs are distributed
with more probability on channels 3 and 4 since they have more benefit in terms of throughput due to
better channel conditions. Notice that even though the FCU and the SFU strategies lose 1 − Pc amount
of their utility on the channels, they compensate that by switching to better channels. Furthermore,
the FCU strategy has more potential in the community since the SFU strategy suffers from S− which
decreases its utility especially in scenarios in which S+ is low. The three scenarios also present the FCU
strategy with different initial number of users where it needs to be the ESS in the community. In our
experiments, the FCU strategy showed (20.3 − 42.2%) improvement over other strategies as shown in
Figure 11-Columns (d)-(f).
To assess the efficacy of the SFU strategy, we conducted 3 experiments using the experimental channel
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Figure 11: Experimental throughput improvement.
Table 5: Experimental Evaluation of the ACU, FCU, and SFU Strategies
Homogeneous channels, Light load
Ps : 0.9, Pc : 0.9, S− : 0.15, P Ui (M bps) : 1, 1, 1, 1

(a) ACU initially dominant, ACU eventual winner

Homogeneous channels, Light load
Ps : 0.9, Pc : 0.85, S− : 0.15, P Ui (M bps) : 1, 1, 1, 1
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(b) FCU initially dominant, ACU eventual winner.

Homogeneous channels, Light load
Ps : 0.9, Pc : 0.85, S− : 0.15, S+ : 0.05, P Ui (M bps) : 1, 1, 1, 1

(c) SFU initially dominant, ACU eventual winner.

Heterogeneous channels, Moderate load
Ps : 0.8, Pc : 0.98, S− : 0.31, S+ : 0.04, P Ui (M bps) : 19, 19, 0.25, 0.25

(d) ACU initially dominant, FCU eventual winner.

Heterogeneous channels, Moderate load
Ps : 0.9, Pc : 0.97, S− : 0.32, S+ : 0.05, P Ui (M bps) : 19, 19, 0.25, 0.25
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(e) FCU initially dominant, FCU eventual winner.

Heterogeneous channels, Moderate load
Ps : 0.8, Pc : 0.95, S− : 0.3, S+ : 0.05, P Ui (M bps) : 19, 19, 0.25, 0.25

(f) SFU initially dominant, FCU eventual winner.

Heterogeneous channels, Heavy load
Ps : 0.5, Pc : 0.98, S− : 0.07, S+ : 0.3, P Ui (M bps) : 19, 19, 0.25, 0.25

(g) ACU initially dominant, SFU eventual winner.

Heterogeneous channels, Heavy load
Ps : 0.5, Pc : 0.95, S− : 0.04, S+ : 0.27, P Ui (M bps) : 19, 19, 0.25, 0.25
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(h) FCU initially dominant, SFU eventual winner.

Heterogeneous channels, Heavy load
Ps : 0.5, Pc : 0.98, S− : 0.06, S+ : 0.31, P Ui (M bps) : 19, 19, 0.25, 0.25

(i) SFU initially dominant, SFU eventual winner.

and strategy parameters detailed in Table 7 and in the headers above each of the figures in Table 5Figure (g)-(i). In these scenarios, two channels were highly loaded with PUs (19M bps), and two channels
were lightly loaded (250kbps). The SFUs had less overhead due to cooperation (i.e., S− decreased), and
receive more enhancement (i.e., R increased by S+ ). The FCU and SFU strategies had more potential
over the ACU strategy due to channel switching, and the SFU strategy had more benefits due to the
social behavior, by allowing Ps percent of SFUs users (50%) to transmit over better channels with the
elevated rate. The SFU strategy then dominates the community and evolve to be the ESS. In our
experiments, the SFU strategy showed (39.1 − 78.3%) improvement over other strategies as shown in
Figure 11-Columns (g)-(i).

54

Discussions
The experimental results are discussed further below.
The ACU strategy outperforms the other strategies in scenarios that involve lightly loaded channels with
similar capacities. In such scenarios, the ACU strategy outperforms since the foraging and sociality incur
unnecessary overhead that negatively impacts the SUs’ utilities and the overall system utility.
The FCU strategy outperforms the other strategies in scenarios that involve moderately loaded channels with dissimilar capacities. In such scenarios, employing the foraging behavior is advantageous
(relative to the ACU strategy) because it allows the SUs to find and use better channels. Social behavior is not advantageous since the deference behavior does not yield significant advantage to reduce the
contention on the channels since the channels are not heavily loaded.
The SFU strategy outperforms other strategies in scenarios that involve heavily loaded channels with
dissimilar capacities. By employing the social deference behavior, only 1 − PS fraction of the SFUs
transmit at a higher rate, while the remaining defer—this yields higher system utility. This is due to the
reduction in contention over channels.
Long-term versus Short-term: The ACU strategy represents a short-term behavior, in which SUs tend
to access channels immediately. The FCU and SFU strategies show more long-term behavior, in which
they sacrifice part of their time to sense the channels and then access better resources in later time.
Altruism versus Selfishness: The SFU strategy shows an altruistic behavior, in which SUs are deferring
to each other based on their social relationships. In contrast, the ACU and FCU strategies show selfcentered selfish behaviors, in which they access channels ignoring the identity of other SUs on the
channels.

Conclusion
In this work, we devised three different strategies in order to address the social aspects of DSA
etiquette. We proved analytically that each strategy has a potential to win or lose in a system of SUs,
based on the condition of the channels utilized and social attributes of the users. Given channel conditions
and users’ behaviors, SUs evolve to one and only one strategy that is considered evolutionary stable.
We showed analytically that no mixed strategies yield a stable strategy for the system. Furthermore,
we showed that, under some conditions, SUs with more social tendency gain more benefits on the long
run when compared with selfish SUs, who prefer myopic, short-term benefits. The proposed analytical
framework, can be extended to study new strategies that exhibit a distinct social and cognitive behaviors,
depending on observed community of SUs and network metrics. Future work includes, but not limited
to, applying the proposed strategies in different use cases such as EHS, IoT, and VANETs.
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Chapter 4

From Channel Selection to Strategy
Selection: Enhancing
VANETs using Foraging and
Deference
Abstract: Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) has been hailed as a possible panacea for the “spectrum
crunch,” drawing significant attention from researchers and industry alike. Here we describe a novel
system architecture for vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) that relies on the DSA framework. In our
system, nodes continuously and independently choose one of three strategies for channel selection. Two
of these strategies are bio-socially inspired, based on resource sharing behaviors known to have been
prevalent in human societies over the course of their natural evolution. We view the strategy selection
problem as an evolutionary game, proving that the only evolutionarily stable strategy is one in which all
nodes utilize the same strategy that depends on the social characteristics of the nodes and the current
channel conditions. Within our system, a specialized Road Side Unit (RSU) continuously computes
the game-theoretically optimal evolutionarily stable strategy and broadcasts this recommendation to
all VANET nodes. Through ns-3 simulation experiments across a range of social characteristics and
channel condition scenarios, we demonstrate a significant and robust improvement in utility (between
3% – 136%) is achieved when a large fraction of VANET nodes adopt the RSU’s recommendation. The
approach represents a bold departure from previous research which sought to track and micro-manage
channel resources, to one that provides VANET nodes with channel selection strategy recommendations
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that is both optimized for throughput and robust against attempts at circumvention by deviant users.

Introduction
Intelligent transportation systems promise to deliver new safety and efficiency applications including
pedestrian and vehicular safety, reduced fuel consumption, and reduced pollution. The design focus of
new systems typically prioritizes one of several broad areas: safety, efficiency, convenience, and infotainment applications [64].
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) are a key technology enabling intelligent transportation systems (Vegni et al. provide a good recent survey [65]). In VANETs, vehicles communicate directly with
each other and with road-side infrastructure. VANETs are critical communication environments due
to the fast mobility of vehicles. The Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) licensed spectrum helps address some of the communication needs of VANETS. Using DSRC spectrum resources in
a manner that scales with VANET size, however, requires robust resource sharing protocols.
Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) is a new resource sharing paradigm in wireless networking, in which
radio spectrum frequencies are assigned dynamically to users in order to combat spectrum scarcity.
Cognitive Radio (CR) is a framework of enabling technologies which facilitate the implementation of
self-configuring DSA networks [4] that allow spectrum sensing, management and sharing. The sensing
technologies developed to coordinate PU-SU interactions [5] can be adapted within the CR paradigm to
enable more harmonious SU-SU co-existence, and ensure more effective resource sharing.
Here we will develop a bio-socially inspired approach to DSA, with the objective of enhancing the
throughput of infotainment applications in VANETs. The impact of this is ensured by the multi-channel
structure of the DSRC in the IEEE Wireless Access to Vehicular Environment (WAVE) standard: by
improving infotainment throughput, greater residual bandwidth becomes available for safety traffic. Generally speaking, bio-socially inspired algorithms leverage knowledge about social and biological communities to design resource management solutions in a variety of domains. Here we apply prior findings on
observed behaviors and structures of resource sharing and co-use in human societies [66] to design a new
and highly effective DSA scheme for VANETs. In keeping with the bio-social paradigm in what follows,
we will use the phrase “consuming a resource” and “transmitting in a channel” interchangeably. Likewise,
the phrase “foraging” will signify passively listening to traffic for the purpose of collecting channel state
information, without transmitting.
This work considers 3 models of resource sharing behaviors:
• Always Consume User (ACU): A user who always consumes, choosing the resource to consume
blindly at random.
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Figure 12: A map of previous work and related areas of inquiry.
• Forage-Consume User (FCU): A user who only sometimes consumes, and otherwise forages,
using information gathered during foraging to choose where next to consume.
• Social Forage-Consume User (SFU): An FCU who sometimes “defers” to other SFUs, that is,
refrains from consuming so as to allow other SFUs more exclusive access to the resource they are
consuming.
To quantify the merit of our proposed behaviors, we will use both simulations and formal analysis
using evolutionary game theoretic techniques. Game theory is a mathematical formalism that can model
strategic interactions among agents, which has been used in a wide range of domains, including wireless
spectrum sharing and sensing [67] [68]. We will rely on the sub-discipline of evolutionary game theory
(EGT), which is specialized to strategic aspects of evolution in terms of individual fitness within a
community [57]. Figure 18 depicts the relationships between our method and several closely related
approaches in previous literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Prior work is discussed in Section 4. Section 4
introduces the proposed approach followed by Section 4 in which we introduce the system model, and
how the three proposed bio-socially inspired strategies are applied in the context of VANETs. Simulation
results are discussed in Section 4. The formal analysis comparing the three strategies (two of which are
bio-socially inspired) is presented in section 4. Finally, Section 4 provides a discussion of the implications,
and an outlines of future research directions.

Prior Work
Different aspects of VANETs have been the subject of active and ongoing research. Several recent
surveys consider VANETs from the specialized perspectives of routing [69], security [70], and new tech-
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nologies [71]. Pagadarai et al. [72] were among the first to explore the potential application of DSA into
vehicular communications, while Khabbas et al. [73] considered the application of DSA in Vehicle to
Infrastructure (V2I) systems.
Some researchers have explored the possibility of using other bands, such as TV White Spaces
(TVWS) [74, 75, 76]. Lim et al. use both TVWS and DSRC bands [75] by using TVWS for Emergency Safety Messages and DSRC for data and control messages. TVWS have also been utilized in the
context of VANETs for route selection [77], minimizing channel switching overhead due to mobility [78],
media streaming [79] and for VANET data offloading [80] [72]. In this paper, we limit consideration to
the DSRC band and to its use for infotainment services.
The notion of “foraging” is of course closely related to spectrum sensing, which is in turn a central
aspect of DSA and the subject of a lot of prior research (see the survey by Abeywardana et al. [81]). In
the VANET context, Kremo et al. developed cooperative spectrum sensing mechanisms for TVWS [82].
Doost-Mohammady et al. developed a system using spectrum sensing base station for database-assisted
cognitive vehicular networks [83]. Tradeoffs between local (vehicular) and global (database-assisted)
spectrum sensing are considered by the work of Al-Ali et al. [84]. Along those lines, in this paper, we are
less concerned with accurate sensing, and more concerned with understanding when sensed information
(that is assumed to be accurate) can be profitably leveraged towards higher throughput, and when it cannot.
Huang et al. explored the potential of spectrum sensing to increase safety traffic throughput [85]; we are
considering an analogous problem here for infotainment traffic.
Many researchers have designed and evaluated services that assist users in finding a good band.
In contrast, in this paper, we propose a cloud-based solution that assists users in choosing a good
channel selection strategy. Examples of previous approaches include that of Rawat et al. who proposed a cloud-based solution in which each vehicle downloads spectrum availability information on one
fixed-channel device while actual vehicular communications take place on a second tunable-channel device [86]. Similarly, Luo et al. develop a database-assisted white space system incorporating technical
and economic features [87]. In their system, white space information is updated periodically by spectrum
licensees, and users send location-based queries to obtain current regional white space listings.
Several authors have previously proposed solutions with a bio-social component. Fei et al., for example, introduce the benefits of leveraging social centrality among users with common interests to enhance
DSA in VANETs [88]. Sociality also plays a role in Frigau et al. proposal for an adaptive multi-channel
social relay strategy [89] that optimizes the transmission of service updates. A social approach for SS is
proposed in [90]. Perhaps closest to our own work is the that of Aygun et al., who developed novel biosocial DSA schemes for VANETs based on the social foraging and consumption behavior of bumblebees
[91]. In this paper, our schemes are based on more complex cognitive and social processes which give rise
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to a range of resource-sharing behaviors observed in human societies of the work of Wisniewska et al. [35]
[10] [11] [12][13] and Shattal et al. [14] [15]. The work benefits from the study provided by Dombrowski
et al. [16] for resource sharing and management in the Inuit community in Labrador, Canada.

Approach
We begin with two observations: (1) Each user does not compete against one other user for a channel,
but rather simultaneously against all other users and over all channels; (2) If users gradually change
strategies over time by mimicking the strategies of peers who are achieving greater utility, then the
system can be considered to be evolving. These two observations naturally point to an evolutionary
game. Playing the field games consider the behavior of a large population of strategically interacting
players [58], each of whom plays against the whole community (or a subset thereof). While pair-wise
games require complete knowledge of the utilities (prior to the game), playing the field games involve
the accumulation of empirical information on relative advantages of pure strategies (see Nash [59]). An
Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is defined to be any strategy which, once adopted by a community,
cannot be displaced by any different “invading” strategy. The ESS may be viewed a Nash equilibrium
since players who unilaterally deviate from the ESS see no gain. Having recognized that our DSA problem
in VANETs can be cast as a game against the field, the ESS of our game will turn out to be critical to
our understanding of the VANET’s performance.
In the proposed architecture (see Figure 13), a community of vehicles moves along a network of
roads that are covered by a set of fixed Road Side Units (RSUs), each of which is connected to a backend cloud-based service. VANET nodes are responsible for periodically reporting their local Channel
State Information (CSI) and sending it to their local RSU, stamped with the current time. Interference
level, noise level, and capacity are examples of potential CSI. In this work, the CSI is simply each node’s
measurement of its own recent throughput in its current channel; we take this as a proxy for the channel’s
residual capacity. Each RSU receives this CSI information from VANET nodes, and continuously updates
a geo-indexed spectrum availability database, effectively producing a live channel-by-channel residual
capacity heatmap (see Figure 14). Each RSU periodically examines this live data, and then via a gametheoretic analysis computes a strategy recommendation, which it sends to all VANET nodes within its
broadcast radius. It is important to note that the RSU’s recommendation is not for specific users to
use specific channels1 —rather the RSU simply recommends that all users (uniformly) follow a particular
strategy.
1 Indeed, individual channel occupancies are likely to be fluctuating so rapidly as to render specific channel recommendations useless.
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Figure 13: Strategic DSA for VANET.

System Model
Our proposed system supports N VANET nodes, each of which sends/receives infotainment data
at a combined rate of R bits/s. The system is designed over the DSRC 5.9 GHz band in alternating
mode (see WAVE standard [92] for details). In this mode, flexible alternating access is provided to
support n = 6 service channels (SCHs) and 1 control channel (CCH). VANET nodes synchronize their
transmission across a 100ms synchronization interval which is, in turn, divided into SCH (α ms), CCH
(β ms) and guard subintervals (see Figure 15, α + β ≈ 100ms). The node send/receives infotainment
data (over IP) to the RSU during the SCH interval, as well as receiving any strategy recommendations
broadcast by the RSU. During the CCH interval, the user broadcasts Basic Safety Messages (BSMs),
WAVE short messages, and WAVE Service Announcements (WSAs). The last of these is used by vehicles
to announce their SCH during the next SCH interval (SCHI). Each SCH has a residual capacity of Ci
bit/s (i = 1, 2, ..., n); and nodes’ recent measurements of their throughput in channel i collectively serve
P
as a proxy for Ci . The normalized residual channel capacity of channel i is defined as Ci = Ci / j Cj .
For system evaluation, we use throughput γ as a metric for infotainment traffic, and Packet Delivery
Ratio (PDR) as the metric for BSM broadcast messages.
Figure 16 provides an interaction diagram for the key entities in our system; the sequence of interactions is as follows.
1. A User enters a coverage area handled by a given RSU.
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Figure 14: System interactions for strategic DSA.
2. The RSU sends the most recently computed ESS as a strategy recommendation to the user, who
then starts accessing the bands using the recommended strategy.
3. During the Service Channel Interval, the user sends/receives infotainment traffic to/from the RSU.
4. During the Control Channel Interval, the user sends BSMs.
5. The User reports sensed CSI along with its corresponding time stamp to the RSU.
6. Reported CSI and selected channel access strategies are stored in a geo-location spectrum database
for strategy analysis.
7. A cloud-based entity computes the ESS strategy based on the geo-location spectrum database
entries for the given service area and time. Steps 2 through 7 repeat periodically.
By providing the ESS as its strategy recommendation to the VANET nodes, the RSU ensures that (if
almost all nodes adopt its recommendation) no small group of opportunistic nodes will be able to gain
unfair advantage by deviating from the recommended strategy. As we shall see in Section 4, the RSU can
actually compute the ESS-based recommendation as a closed-form expression, based on the aggregated
CSI data.
In this work, we consider a “menu” of three strategies (two of which are bio-socially inspired):
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Figure 15: Synchronization interval in alternating mode in IEEE 1609.4.
The Always Consume User (ACU) is always transmitting on an SCH that is uniformly selected
from all SCHs. This strategy was used previously by Xin et al. [28], and allows the ACU to act with a
naive opportunistic view to capture utility using the set of channel resources. The ACU’s strategy can
be implemented cheaply since no sensing capability is needed. The channel selection process itself is fast,
requiring minimal computational resources and no coordination overhead. When transmitting, an FCU
chooses to transmit on channel i with probability 1/n.
The Forage Consume User (FCU) engages in two different activities stochastically. With probability Pf it “forages,” sensing CSI2 while ceasing transmission, while with probability Pc = 1 − Pf , it
“consumes” or transmits data on a SCH. When transmitting, an FCU chooses to transmit on channel i
with probability Ci . The FCU forgoes short-term utility benefits while in the foraging state, but may
stand to gain more long-term utility by acquiring data about the channels. On the other hand, too much
foraging could yield inefficient usage of spectrum resources and decreased user’s utility. FCU accesses
channels based on channel characteristics, favoring channels with higher residual capacity.
Advancing from FCU, the Social Forage Consume User (SFU) incorporates sociality as an
additional factor in its channel selection logic. This type of user has sensing capabilities beyond the
measurement of relative capacity levels. In particular, SFUs may be biased against not transmitting on
channels where other SFUs are transmitting. We refer to this phenomenon as deference. The SFU
strategy model reflects well-known findings from the structure of animal societies [29] and well as those
of non-human primates [30], where sociality plays a significant organizing function and helps towards
species survival. To model this phenomenon concretely, we assume that while consuming, an SFU can
either be in Defer state (relative frequency Ps ) or Active state (relative frequency 1 − Ps ). While in
Defer, a user does not transmit at all; in contrast, while in Active, the user transmits at an elevated rate
(1 + S+ )R, making use of the additional bandwidth made available by the deference of their peers. To
2 In this work, we do not focus on contributions toward the problem of spectrum sensing, but rather assume that an FCU
has access to “sufficient” information about the channel at the moment of decision-making. In our analysis and simulation
experiments (described in later sections), the FCU has access to basic CSI on noise and interference levels), implemented
as channel sniffing spectrum sensing at the MAC layer.
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Figure 16: Sequence of system events.
account for the potential costs of deference coordination among the SFUs, we will assume that each gives
up S− fraction of its utility towards coordination overhead. We take S− ∝ c0 N h where h ∈ [0, 2] is the
penalty due to coordination overhead among SFUs to access the channel. The parameter h represents
the extent of coordination, with h = 2 being full coordination and h = 0 being no coordination.
The RSU aggregates and relays per-band throughput measurements from its area nodes to the cloud.
The cloud service uses this data to compute the evolutionary stable strategy through simulations. The
existence of such a strategy is analyzed in Section 4. Having computed the ESS, the cloud relays this
optimal strategy to the RSU, which then broadcasts it onwards to its area nodes; the data flow is shown
in Figures (13) and (16). The performance advantage of such a scheme is explored in Section 4. Note that
the recommendation only specifies the strategy type (e.g., ACU, FCU or SFU), and not node attributes
(e.g., Pc , Ps , S+ ) which are assumed to be static and external to the optimization process. The dynamic
optimization of node-specific parameters, and a fine-grained analysis of control traffic overhead are beyond
the scope of this work and are planned for future research. Here we seek to evaluate the feasibility of
the proposed bio-social strategies and their optimal dynamic selection in the VANET domain, and to
understand the impact of social attributes on the performance of the infotainment traffic.

Research Questions
The potential of using a bio-social model to enhance spectrum access in the context of the VANETs
prompts the following research questions:
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Table 6: System Parameters

Constants

Input Parameters

Calculated Parameters
Output Parameters

Symbol
n
N
Cimax
Ci
α
Pc
Ps
S+
S−
Ci
β
Gs
γ(.)

Parameter
Number of service channels
Number of vehicles
Maximum service channel capacity
Service channel capacity
Service channel interval
Probability of consume
Probability of Sociality
enhancement due to sociality
Overhead of sociality
Relative service channel capacity
Control channel interval
Sociality gain
Fraction of attained vehicle throughput

Value/Range
6SCHs
162, 210
10M bps
varies in [0, Cimax ]
varies in [0 − 100]ms
varies in [0, 1]
varies in [0, 1]
varies in [0, 1]
varies in [0, 1]
P
Ci / j Cj
100ms − α
(1 − S− ).(1 + S+ )
[0,1]

1. Can the bio-socially inspired FCU, and SFU strategies enhance spectrum access and utilization in
VANETs, compared to the baseline performance of ACUs?
2. From the perspective of group performance outcomes, is there a uniform “best strategy” to be played,
or does the best choice depend on the environmental conditions?
3. Is the best choice with respect to group performance outcomes “robust” against unilateral actions
of users who try to deviate from it individually for selfish motives?
We will gain experimental intuitions into the first two questions through simulation experiments in
Section 4. There we shall see that (1) the bio-social schemes FCU and SFU can often enhance spectrum
access and utilization (compared to baseline performance of ACUs) in VANETs, but that (2) which of the
three strategies performs best depends very much on the environmental conditions. Those insights will be
proved in Section 4, where we will also resolve question (3) by a formal analysis showing that once a group
adopts the best strategy, no user can gain any advantage by deviating from the group’s chosen strategy
(assuming the environment does not change significantly). In resolving these questions, we arrive at a
new understanding of resource co-use dynamics, which in turn motivates the architectural design of our
system for enhanced VANET communication: (I) A road-side unit continuously senses environmental
conditions, computes the optimal bio-social strategy, and broadcasts this as a recommendation to all
users; (II) users willingly adopt the strategy recommendation, knowing that by doing so they will get
optimal utility as a group (across the space of bio-social strategies), and assurance that no (sufficiently
small set of) users will be to do better by taking an alternative strategy.
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Table 7: Simulation Parameters
Parameter
Number of Channels (n)
Number of vehicles (N )
Vehicle transmission rate (R)
Channel Capacity (Ci )
Pc , Ps , S+ , S−
Number of packets
Transmission Range
WLAN Standard
Simulation Time
Number of replications

Value
6 SCHs, 1 CCH
162, 210
10 kbps (once every 100ms)
OFDM 3Mbps
Varies based on the experiment
IP: 1, 6, 14, BSM: 10
500m
IEEE 802.11p
10 seconds
10

Simulation Performance Analysis
Our experiments are carried out using ns-3 [93] to simulate an 802.11p environment with 6 service
channels and 1 control channel, all OFDM channels with a data rate of 3Mbps (see Table 7 for details).
When experiments required a heterogeneous spectrum environment, we set channels 1,2,3 to have an
energy detection level of −61.1dBm, while the channels 4,5,6 operate at a −91.1dBm setting. When we
needed to consider scenarios with homogeneous spectrum environment, we set all 6 channels to operate
at a −91.1dBm setting.
Within each experiment, 162−210 DSA vehicles generate infotainment traffic in conformance with the
IEEE WAVE 802.11p standard in multi-channel operation mode [92]. Each vehicle transmits on a channel
that is dynamically updated in a continuous stochastic manner, as prescribed by the vehicle’s chosen
bio-social channel selection strategy. Each vehicle must choose between three channel selection strategies:
ACU, FCU and SFU (the latter two being bio-socially inspired). To compare the efficacy of the different
strategy choices, we consider 3 homogeneous systems where 100% of the population use the same strategy;
we also consider 3 heterogeneous populations where 80% of the vehicles employ one strategy, while the
remaining 20% of the population is deviant, with 10% adopting each of the remaining two strategies.
There are thus 6 distinct simulation scenarios in each experiment (3 homogeneous and corresponding to
each, a heterogeneous system). By measuring the performance of each homogeneous strategy in various
settings, we can determine which is dominant across a range of environmental conditions. By comparing
the performance of nodes in each homogeneous strategy with the performance achieved by deviant nodes
in the corresponding heterogeneous system, we can measure the evolutionary stability of the homogeneous
system.

Simulation Results and Discussion
In this section, we address research questions (1) and (2) from the previous section.
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Can the FCU channel selection strategy outperform all other strategies in some circumstances? We
hypothesize that scenarios which favor FCUs are marked by heterogeneous channel characteristics, or
when the cost of sociality is high Ps (1 − S− ) relative to its benefit. To test this hypothesis, we configured
our simulation to consist of n = 6 channels with normalized residual capacities Ci = ( 19 , 19 , 19 , 29 , 92 , 29 ).
In such a system, FCUs and SFUs have probability of
and probability of

2
3

1
3

to access “good” channels 1,2,3 (−61.1dBm)

to access “bad” channels 4,5,6 (−91.1dBm). Within this environment, we placed

N = 162 vehicles, 80% of which adopted the FCU channel selection strategy, while the remaining 20%
utilized the ACU and SFU strategies evenly. This is compared with populations that totally employed
FCU strategy. Each vehicle sent 6 IP packets per α = 10..50 ms, yielding transmission rates R =
60KBytes/sec = 480Kbps. For FCUs and SFUs, the probability of foraging was set at 2% (Pc = 0.98).
SFUs deferred to peers 30% of the time (Ps = 0.3) but then transmitted at rate elevated 5% above
normal when in active state (S+ = 0.05). To implement this social structure, SFUs were charged 60%
overhead to account for group coordination costs (S− = 0.6). Table 8-Figure (a) shows the throughput
achieved in each of the three homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios. As shown in Table 8-Figure
(b), FCUs obtain 82.6% - 136.8% improvement in throughput over ACUs and SFUs. Even though FCUs
spend time not consuming (Pc < 1), they are able to compensate for this loss and outperform ACUs
because they can choose better channels for transmission as a result of their sensing capabilities. FCUs
also outperform SFUs in this scenario because SFU defer too readily, and the cost of their deference and
coordination is high.
Can the SFU channel selection strategy outperform all other strategies in some circumstances? We
hypothesize that the SFU strategy outperforms the other strategies in highly loaded network scenarios.
In these scenarios, channels are not able to accommodate all the demand and there will be an emergent
need for social deference. In order to test this hypothesis, we configured the simulation to consist of
n = 6 channels with normalized residual capacities Ci = ( 19 , 19 , 91 , 29 , 92 , 29 ). In such a system, FCUs
and SFUs have probability of

1
3

to access “good” channels 1,2,3 (−61.1dBm) and probability of

2
3

to

access “bad” channels 4,5,6 (−91.1dBm). Within this environment, we placed N = 210 vehicles, 80% of
which adopted the SFU channel selection strategy, while the remaining 20% utilized the ACU and FCU
strategies evenly. This is compared with populations that totally employed SFU strategy. Each vehicle
sent 14 IP packets per α = 10..50 ms, yielding transmission rates R = 140KBytes/sec = 1120Kbps. For
FCUs and SFUs, the probability of foraging was set at 1% (Pc = 0.99). SFUs deferred to peers 80%
of the time (Ps = 0.8) but then transmitted at rate elevated 40% above normal when in active state
(S+ = 0.4). To implement this social structure, SFUs were charged 4% overhead to account for group
coordination costs (S− = .04). Table 8-Figure (c) shows the throughput achieved in each of the three
homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios. As shown in Table 8-Figure (d), SFUs obtain 3.1% - 10.5%
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improvement in throughput over ACUs and FCUs. In such scenarios, nodes with social behavior will be
able to gain more utility by coordinating so that only Ps fraction of them are deferring, while only 1 − Ps
fraction are actively transmitting, albeit at an elevated rate. This results in decreased contention over
the channels and helps users to access better channels more frequently in order to improve their utility.
Under such network conditions, ACUs and FCUs fail to achieve better utility since these nodes do not
defer to others, and therefore, experience higher contention on channels. Notice that as the number of
vehicles and their load increases, the SFU strategy gains more utility compared to other strategies as
shown in Table 8-Figures (c).
Under what conditions does ACU outperform the bio-social FCU and SFU strategies? We hypothesize
that the ACU strategy outperforms the other strategies in lightly loaded network scenarios where channel
conditions are homogeneous. In these scenarios, channels are able to accommodate all the demand and
there is no need for foraging and social behaviors. In order to test this hypothesis, we configured the
simulation to consist of n = 6 channels with normalized residual capacities Ci = ( 16 , 16 , 16 , 16 , 16 , 16 ). In such
a system, FCUs and SFUs have probability of

1
6

to access all 6 channels configured with (−91.1dBm)

energy detection threshold. Within this environment, we placed N = 162 vehicles, 80% of which adopted
the ACU channel selection strategy, while the remaining 20% utilized the FCU and SFU strategies evenly.
This is compared with populations that totally employed ACU strategy. Each vehicle sent 1 IP packets
per α = 10..50 ms, yielding transmission rates R = 10KBytes/sec = 80Kbps. For FCUs and SFUs, the
probability of foraging was set at 40% (Pc = 0.6). SFUs deferred to peers 40% of the time (Ps = 0.4) but
then transmitted at rate elevated 5% above normal when in active state (S+ = 0.05). To implement this
social structure, SFUs were charged 30% overhead to account for group coordination costs (S− = .3).
Table 8-Figure (e) shows the throughput achieved in each of the three homogeneous and heterogeneous
scenarios. As shown in Table 8-Figure (f), ACUs obtain 97.7% to 1839.2% higher throughput than
FCUs and SFUs. Thus, FCUs and SFUs receive less throughput than the baseline strategy (i.e., ACU)
in scenarios with light infotainment traffic. In such settings, the foraging behavior employed by FCUs
and SFUs offers little benefit, since the time spent in foraging and sensing decreases the utility of the
nodes and provides little useful information; similarly, the social deference of SFUs leads Ps fraction
of the nodes to defer transmissions, which is unnecessary given the traffic conditions, and only lowers
throughput.
In all the simulations above, in addition to evaluating throughput for infotainment traffic, we also
measured the packet delivery ratios for safety traffic. The ACU, FCU, and SFU strategies only concern
the transmission for infotainment IP packets, and do not affect the transmission of safety traffic such as
BSM messages. Figure 17 shows the PDR for safety traffic in networks corresponding to experiments of
Table 8-Figure (e) and (f) where the efficacy of the ACU strategy was being evaluated. The figure shows
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the PDR for BSM broadcasts in a scenario with 162 nodes transmitting 10 BSMs per CCH interval.
The figure clearly shows that as SCH interval increases, the CCH interval decreases, yielding a decreased
delivery ratio of the BSM packets.
These results demonstrate the interplay between infotainment and safety traffic. As the SCH interval
increases, the throughput for infotainment traffic increases and the PDR for safety traffic decreases; the
reverse is true as well, and hence the trade off. This work does not address the optimal design of the
SCHI and CCHI values. However, it shows the feasibility of employing the proposed bio-socially inspired
strategies in the realm of vehicular networks that utilize DSA in support of infotainment applications.
We have arrived at an experimentally derived intuition concerning questions (1) and (2): it appears
that the bio-socially inspired FCU, and SFU strategies can indeed sometimes enhance spectrum access
and utilization in VANETs (compared to the baseline performance of ACUs), but the best strategy choice
depends on the environmental conditions. The FCU and SFU strategies have two distinct behaviors.
FCUs tend to immediately benefit from the knowledge about the underlying channel conditions and try
to access better channels more frequently (i.e., with higher probability). SFUs provide the users with
the ability to grant their share of the bandwidth to other fellow nodes in the SFU group (i.e., altruistic
behavior), and prefer to let others transmit on channels when the channels are crowded in favor of
obtaining more utility from a group perspective. We say that FCUs tend to have a short-term view and
selfish behavior, while SFUs which have a long-term view and altruistic behavior. Experimentally, we
observe that both strategies benefit (relative to ACUs), under suitable channel and traffic conditions.
These experimental intuitions will be proven in the next section.

Analytical Performance Analysis
Here will will prove the experimental intuitions of the previous section concerning research questions
(1) and (2), as well as address research question (3).

Preliminaries
We distinguish the concept of a mixed strategy from that of a heterogeneous population. A node that
employs a mixed strategy switches between pure strategies over time at random; it might act like an ACU
10% of the time, like an FCU 60% of the time, and like an SFU 30% of the time. We will not consider
mixed strategies in this paper. A heterogeneous population on the other hand, is a population in which
each SU employ a “pure” strategy (an ACU, or an FCU, or an SFU, and uses the corresponding strategy
100% of the time); different nodes in the population, however, may use different strategies. In this paper,
a homogeneous population will be one in which all the nodes use the same pure strategy.
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Table 8: Simulation Results for Proposed Strategies Under Various Channels’ Conditions and Nodes’
Properties
Heterogeneous channel capacity, Lightly loaded: Pc : 0.98, Ps : 0.3, S+ : 0.05, S− : 0.6

(a) FCU strategy outperforms, utility increases with SCHI

Heterogeneous channel capacity, Lightly loaded: Pc : 0.98, Ps : 0.3, S+ : 0.05, S− : 0.6

(b) Improvement on throughput corresponding to Figure (a)

Heterogeneous channel capacity, Highly loaded: Pc : 0.99, Ps : 0.8, S+ : 0.4, S− : 0.04

(c) SFU strategy outperforms, utility increases with SCHI
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Heterogeneous channel capacity, Highly loaded: Pc : 0.99, Ps : 0.8, S+ : 0.4, S− : 0.04

(d) Improvement on throughput corresponding to Figure (c)

Homogeneous channel capacity, Lightly loaded: Pc : 0.6, Ps : 0.4, S+ : 0.05, S− : 0.3

(e) ACU strategy outperforms, utility increases with SCHI

Homogeneous channel capacity, Lightly loaded : Pc : 0.6, Ps : 0.4, S+ : 0.05, S− : 0.3

(f) Improvement on throughput corresponding to Figure (e)

We follow the analysis presented in [61] for a formal definition of ESS. A strategy σ ∗ is an ESS, if
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mutants that adopt another strategy σ leave fewer offsprings in the post-entry population x where:
x = (1 − )σ ∗ + σ

(1)

assuming that the proportion of mutants  is sufficiently small (0 <  < ). Hence, for σ ∗ to be ESS,
then:
U (σ ∗ , x ) > U (σ, x )

(2)

where U (σ ∗ , x ) is the payoff (i.e., utility) of players that play σ ∗ and U (σ, x ) is the payoff of the mutants
that play σ in the post-entry population x .

Mathematical Model
Consider a heterogeneous system S in which there are k1 ACUs, k2 FCUs, k3 SFUs, In S, there is
just one channel of capacity C and ACUs and FCUs transmit at a rate of r1 while SF U s transmit at a
rate of r2 . Such a system will be specified by a 5-tuple

S = (k1 , k2 , k3 , r1 , r2 )

The fractional throughput of each SU in S will be written as

Xγ (S) := γ(C, k1 + k2 , r1 , k3 , r2 )

we will say more about the functional form of γ shortly.
Now, when we consider a system S ∗

S ∗ = (nACU , nF CU , nSF U , R, (1 + S+ )R)

(3)

having access M > 1 channels of capacities C1 , . . . CM . In what follows, S ∗ will always consist of a set of
SUs who each follow a pure strategy. We will, however, sometimes subject system to the possibility that
some fraction of its players could “mutate” or “defect” or “switch” to different (possibly mixed) strategy.
Assuming S ∗ is in steady state, the expected number of ACUs, FCUs and SFUs in channel i is given
by
NACU
M

i
OACU

:=

OFi CU

:= Ci NF CU

i
OSF
U

:= Ci (1 − PS )NSF U
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The total demand for channel i is computable as

i
i
Di (S ∗ ) = (OACU
+ OFi CU ) ∗ R + OSF
U ∗ (1 + S+ )R

and the fractional throughput of users in channel i is:

i
i
Xγi (S ∗ ) := γ(Ci , OACU
+ OFi CU , R, OSF
U , (1 + S+ )R)

While the precise form of γ is intractable, we will take

Xγi (S ∗ ) =



 1



if Di (S ∗ ) < ρCi

1
∗
expDi (S )−ρCi

if Di (S ∗ ) ≥ ρCi

Here ρ is a fitting parameter chosen so that γ mirrors experimental measurements.
In what follows we define U (S ∗ ; s, x ) as the utility received by users employing strategy s in a multiband system S ∗ of a mixed population that utilize employing strategies different from s. For convenience,
U (S ∗ ; s, x ) is denoted as Us (S ∗ ). The stability of the strategy, when it exists, is guaranteed only when
the number of users deviating from strategy s is sufficiently small.
In system (S ∗ ), the utility achieved by each ACU, FCU, and SFU respectively is:
M
1 X
R · Xγi (S ∗ )
M i=1

UACU (S ∗ )

=

ν

UF CU (S ∗ )

=

νPc

M
X

Ci R · Xγi (S ∗ )

i=1

USF U (S ∗ )

=

νPc

M
X

Ci R · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ )

i=1

where ν =

α
α+β

is the service channel duty cycle, and Gs = (1 + S+ ) · (1 − S− ) is the sociality gain.

Existence of ESS—the general framework
In this section, we describe the conditions in which a homogeneous system of SUs is an ESS—that
is, invasion by any competing mixed strategy will fail, provided the invading population is sufficiently
small. Towards this, we will first state a general formulation of conditions for an ESS in the Lemma
below. This lemma will be specialized and applied to homogeneous systems of ACUs, FCUs, and SFUs
in the next section. The next definition will be helpful in the results that follow.
Definition 2. Let S ∗ be the system in (3), and σ ∗ = (p∗ , q ∗ , k ∗ ) and σ = (p, q, k) are mixed strategies
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Figure 17: PDR for BSM traffic
where ACU, FCU, SFU are used with probabilities p∗ , q ∗ , k ∗ , for σ ∗ and p, q, k, for σ, respectively;
where (p∗ + q ∗ + k ∗ = 1) and (p + q + k = 1). Define

A(S ∗ , σ ∗ , σ) = p∗ (p∗ − p) · UACU (S ∗ ) + q ∗ (q ∗ − q) · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k ∗ (k ∗ − k) · USF U (S ∗ )
B(S ∗ , σ ∗ , σ) = (p∗ − p)2 · UACU (S ∗ ) + (q ∗ − q)2 · UF CU (S ∗ ) + (k ∗ − k)2 · USF U (S ∗ )
Lemma 2. Let S ∗ be the system in (3), and suppose that the majority 1− of SUs employ σ ∗ = (p∗ , q ∗ , k ∗ )
where ACU, FCU, SFU are used with probabilities p∗ , q ∗ , k ∗ , respectively. When a small  fraction of SUs
contemplate a defection to a mixed strategy σ = (p, q, k) where ACU, FCU, SFU are used with probabilities
p, q, k, respectively, then for  sufficiently small, the defection fails to be rational. In particular, S ∗ is
evolutionarily stable as long as
<

A(S ∗ , σ ∗ , σ)
B(S ∗ , σ ∗ , σ)

(4)

Proof. Since  ≈ 0 the payoff for a defecting player is:

Uσ (S ∗ ) = p · UACU (S ∗ ) + q · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k · USF U (S ∗ )

(5)

The existence of an ESS in an EGT game requires the inequality condition of Equation (2) to hold.
Suppose σ ∗ = (p∗ , q ∗ , k ∗ ) is the strategy employed in S ∗ and σ = (p, q, k) is the strategy of the defectors.
The utility achieved by the defectors is

Uσ = p [p∗ − (p∗ − p)] · UACU (S ∗ ) + q [q ∗ − (q ∗ − q)] · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k [k ∗ − (k ∗ − k)] · USF U (S ∗ ) (6)
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while the non-defectors achieve

Uσ∗ = p∗ [p∗ − (p∗ − p)] · UACU (S ∗ ) + q ∗ [q ∗ − (q ∗ − q)] · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k ∗ [k ∗ − (k ∗ − k)] · USF U (S ∗ )
(7)
It is easy to check that Uσ∗ > Uσ if and only if  < A/B.

Existence of ESS—Applied to VANETs
Since we have three pure strategies and one mixed strategy we need the following five propositions
to study the existence of ESS:
Proposition 6. If S ∗ is a homogeneous system of ACUs, a defection to strategy σ = (p, q, k) by an 
fraction of players fails to be rational if  is less than
(1 − p) · UACU (S ∗ )
(1 − p)2 · UACU (S ∗ ) + q 2 · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k 2 · USF U (S ∗ )
Proof. Using Lemma 2, we specialize Definition 2 to the situation σ ∗ = (1, 0, 0) to obtain

A(S ∗ , σ ∗ , σ)

=

(1 − p) · UACU (S ∗ )

B(S ∗ , σ ∗ , σ)

=

(1 − p)2 · UACU (S ∗ ) + q 2 · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k 2 · USF U (S ∗ )

The proposition is proved.
As UACU (S ∗ ) decreases, we see that the bound on  in Proposition 6 approaches 0, making it more
likely that users will defect away from the homogeneous ACU society. Conversely, as UACU (S ∗ ) increases
relative to UF CU (S ∗ ) and USF U (S ∗ ), we see that the bound on  approaches 1, making it so users will
be unable to defect away from the homogeneous ACU society without group coordination.
Proposition 7. If S ∗ is a homogeneous system of FCUs, a defection to strategy σ = (p, q, k) by an 
fraction of players fails to be rational if  is less than
(1 − q) · UF CU (S ∗ )
p2 · UACU (S ∗ ) + (1 − q)2 · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k 2 · USF U (S ∗ )
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Proof. Using Lemma 2, we specialize Definition 2 to the situation σ ∗ = (0, 1, 0) to obtain

A(S ∗ , σ ∗ , σ)

=

(1 − q) · UF CU (S ∗ )

B(S ∗ , σ ∗ , σ)

=

p2 · UACU (S ∗ ) + (1 − q)2 · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k 2 · USF U (S ∗ )

The proposition is proved.
As UF CU (S ∗ ) decreases, we see that the bound on  in Proposition 7 approaches 0, making it more
likely that users will defect away from the homogeneous FCU society. Conversely, as UF CU (S ∗ ) increases
relative to UACU (S ∗ ) and USF U (S ∗ ), we see that the bound on  approaches 1, making it so users will
be unable to defect away from the homogeneous FCU society without group coordination.
Proposition 8. If S ∗ is a homogeneous system of SFUs, a defection to strategy σ = (p, q, k) by an 
fraction of players fails to be rational if  is less than

p2

· UACU

(S ∗ )

(1 − k) · USF U (S ∗ )
+ q 2 · UF CU (S ∗ ) + (1 − k)2 · USF U (S ∗ )

Proof. Using Lemma 2, we specialize Definition 2 to the situation σ ∗ = (0, 0, 1) to obtain

A(S ∗ , σ ∗ , σ)

=

(1 − k) · USF U (S ∗ )

B(S ∗ , σ ∗ , σ)

=

p2 · UACU (S ∗ ) + q 2 · UF CU (S ∗ ) + (1 − k)2 · USF U (S ∗ )

The proposition is proved.
As USF U (S ∗ ) decreases, we see that the bound on  in Proposition 7 approaches 0, making it more
likely that users will defect away from the homogeneous SFU society. Conversely, as USF U (S ∗ ) increases
relative to UACU (S ∗ ) and UF CU (S ∗ ), we see that the bound on  approaches 1, making it so users will
be unable to defect away from the homogeneous SFU society without group coordination.
Proposition 9. If S ∗ is a system in which

UACU (S ∗ ) = UF CU (S ∗ ) = USF U (S ∗ )
then no evolutionary stable strategy exists in S ∗ .
Proof. If all utilities of all strategies are equal then players may switch and mix strategies without
penalty, and because the strict inequality in (2) cannot be made to hold for any strategy, no strategy is
evolutionarily stable.
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Proposition 10. If S ∗ is a system in which UACU (S ∗ ), UF CU (S ∗ ) and USF U (S ∗ ) are pairwise distinct,
and σ is evolutionary stable strategy S ∗ , then σ is a pure strategy.
Proof. Suppose σ is the ESS. The payoff for this strategy is

Uσ (S ∗ ) = p · UACU (S ∗ ) + q · UF CU (S ∗ ) + k · USF U (S ∗ )

This function is convex combination, and so is maximized by placing all the probability mass on the
unique strategy which has the highest utility. Thus, precisely one of the values p, q, k is equal to 1.
Corollary 2. If S ∗ is a system in which UACU (S ∗ ), UF CU (S ∗ ) and USF U (S ∗ ) are pairwise distinct, and
σ is evolutionary stable strategy S ∗ , then



ACU



σ=
FCU




 SFU

if UACU (S ∗ ) > UF CU (S ∗ ), USF U (S ∗ )
if UF CU (S ∗ ) > UACU (S ∗ ), USF U (S ∗ )
if USF U (S ∗ ) > UACU (S ∗ ), UF CU (S ∗ )

Finding an ESS
Theorem 5. For a system S ∗ where Xγi (S ∗ ) ≈ 1, ACU is a winning strategy iff: Pc < min(1, G1s ).
Proof. Corollary 2 mandates that UACU (S ∗ ) > UF CU (S ∗ ) and UACU (S ∗ ) > USF U (S ∗ ), which implies:
M
1 X i ∗
X (S ) >
M i=1 γ

Pc

PM

i=1

Ci · Xγi (S ∗ )

(8)

Ci · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ )

(9)

i=1

M
1 X i ∗
X (S ) >
M i=1 γ

Substituting Xγi (S ∗ ) = 1 and

M
X

Pc

M
X
i=1

Ci = 1, we get

Pc

<

1

Pc · Gs

<

1

The theorem is proved.
Theorem 6. For a system S ∗ , where

∀i, j : 1 . . . M, Ci = Cj

ACU is a winning strategy iff: Pc < min(1, G1s ).
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Proof. Since Ci = Cj for all i, j it follows that

Ci = Cj = 1/M

Substituting into inequalities (8) and (9), we get

Pc

<

1

Pc · Gs

<

1

The theorem is proved.
Reflections on Theorems (5) and (6): The antecedent in Theorem (5) means that all channels
are able to accommodate the demand, and thus, from the nodes’ perspective, their demand is fulfilled
regardless of their channel choices. ACUs benefit directly from this condition as they randomly access
the channels. SFUs and FCUs detect this condition using their foraging capability, but to gain this
knowledge, they sacrifice some of their channel access time by foraging some fraction (Pf = 1 − Pc )
of the time. This hinders their ability to gain utility relative to ACUs. On the other hand, SFUs can
recapture some of this loss by the advantage derived from social behavior (Gs ). As long as the effects of
foraging and social gain are less than 1, however, SFUs cannot outperform ACUs under this condition.
The antecedent in Theorem (6), states that the utilities of all channels are equal but not necessarily
1. This happens when the different channels provide similar throughput; this uniformity implies that
the utility lost to time spent foraging was in vain since it yielded no information about the channel
environment. This leads to the same conclusion as that of Theorem (5).
Connections to previous ns-3 experiments: The conclusion from Theorem (6) is also observed
in our ns-3 experimental results as can be seen in Table 8-Figure (e)-(f). These figures are based on
scenarios in which the different channels have similar conditions.
Theorem 7. For a system S ∗ , FCU is a winning strategy iff:

Pc >

PM
i
∗
1
i=1 Xγ (S )
P
i
∗
M M
i=1 Ci · Xγ (S )

(10)

and
Gs < 1

(11)
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Proof. Corollary 2 mandates that UF CU (S ∗ ) > UACU (S ∗ ) and UF CU (S ∗ ) > USF U (S ∗ ), which implies:

Pc

M
X

Ci · Xγi (S ∗ ) >

i=1

Pc

M
X

Ci ·

Xγi (S ∗ )

>

M
1 X i ∗
X (S )
M i=1 γ

Pc

M
X

Ci · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ )

i=1

i=1

Rearranging terms of the two inequalities, the theorem is proved.
Reflections on Theorem 7: The antecedent in Theorem (7) assert a lower-bound on the probability
of consuming that is the ratio of the ACU and FCU utilities, and indicate that the social gain is smaller
than 1. We know already from Theorems (5) and (6), that ACUs outperform all strategies when channels
have uniform conditions. In non-uniform settings, FCUs and SFUs have the tendency to access channels
with better throughput, based on the values of Ci . In non-uniform channel settings, the weighted average
in the denominator is greater than the unweighted average in the numerator, and so the ratio of ACU to
FCU utilities decreases below 1; the lower bound on Pc then drops correspondingly, and (for appropriately
chosen Pc < 1) foraging wins. The second antecedent upper-bounds the sociality gain (Gs ) to be less
than 1. This condition restricts the SFUs from compensating for their social coordination overhead and
ensures that FCUs outperform SFUs.
Connections to previous ns-3 experiments: The conclusion from Theorem (7) is also observed
in our ns-3 experimental results as can be seen in Table 8-Figure (a)-(b). These figures are based on
scenarios in which the channels have non-uniform conditions and the sociality overhead (S− ) limits (Gs )
and curtails SFU utilities.
Theorem 8. For a system S ∗ , SFU is a winning strategy iff:
PM
i
∗
1
i=1 Xγ (S )
Pc >
PM
M i=1 Ci · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ )

(12)

Gs > 1

(13)

and

Proof. Corollary 2 mandates that UF CU (S ∗ ) > UACU (S ∗ ) and UF CU (S ∗ ) > USF U (S ∗ ), which implies:

Pc

M
X

Ci · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ ) >

M
1 X i ∗
X (S )
M i=1 γ

Ci · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ ) >

Pc

i=1

Pc

M
X
i=1

M
X

Ci · Xγi (S ∗ )

i=1

Rearranging terms of the two inequalities, the theorem is proved.
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Reflections on Theorem 8: The antecedent in Theorem (8) assert a lower-bound the probability
of consume that is the ratio of the ACU and SFU utilities, and prescribe a sociality gain greater than 1.
We know already from Theorems (5) and (6), that ACUs outperform all strategies when channels have
uniform conditions. In non-uniform settings, FCUs and SFUs have the tendency to access channels with
better throughput, based on the values of Ci . In non-uniform channel settings, the weighted average in
the denominator is greater than the unweighted average in the numerator, and so the ratio of ACU to
FCU utilities decreases below 1; the lower bound on Pc then drops correspondingly, and (for appropriately
chosen Pc < 1) foraging wins. The second antecedent lower-bounds the sociality gain (Gs ) to be greater
than 1. This condition allows the SFUs to benefit from their social coordination and ensures that SFUs
outperform FCUs.
Reflections on the ns-3 experiments: The conclusion from Theorem (8) is also observed in our
ns-3 experimental results as can be seen in Table 8-Figure (c)-(d). These figures are based on scenarios
in which the channels have non-uniform conditions and the sociality overhead (S− ) is low enough such
that SFUs are able to acquire greater utility (Gs ) than their non-social foraging counterparts.

Conclusions and Future Work
The advent of large-scale VANETs heralds the emergent problems of device co-existence and the
potential of device sociality in the ecosystem of the radio spectrum. Here we considered two bio-socially
inspired strategies for VANETS, based on resource foraging and social deference; we compared them to
a baseline strategy driven by continuous blind consumption. We found (see Section 4) that one of these
three strategies is always dominant, and while the winning strategy depends on channel conditions, it is
stable against defections by small numbers of deviating nodes. The intuitions for these theoretical results,
and the empirical evaluation of their merits were obtained through extensive simulation experiments (see
Section 4)—where we saw that the optimal strategy enjoys utility gains of 3%-136% relative to baseline.
Taken together, these results together point to a new way of thinking about resource allocation
problem: one where optimal and stable channel selection strategies are computed and uniformly recommended, rather than the current view where individual channels are micromanaged and allocated by a
central authority. This new model is envisioned at the core of a VANET communications system, where
a road-side unit aggregates and relays per-band throughput measurements from its area nodes to the
cloud. The cloud service then uses the data to compute the evolutionary stable strategy based on the
collected data. Having computed the optimal stable strategy, the cloud relays it to the RSU, which then
broadcasts it onwards to its area nodes.
The present work considers recommendations of strategy type (i.e., ACU, FCU or SFU) only, and
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not node attributes (i.e., Pc , Ps , S+ ). The dynamic optimization of node-specific parameters, and a finegrained analysis of control traffic overhead is planned for future research. Hardware implementation
of an experimental testbed based on the proposed bio-socially inspired DSA systems are planned, to
complement and validate the analytic and simulation findings presented here.
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Chapter 5

Social Avoidance and Deference
Etiquettes in Support of Dynamic
Spectrum Access
Abstract: Dynamic Spectrum Access leverages different approaches and solutions to provide better
spectrum utilization over scarce underutilized expensive spectrum. In this work we seek biologically and
socially approach mimicking humans and prime-mates behaviors over resources to enhance the spectrum
utilization. Specifically, two bio-socially inspired behaviors are introduced and combined to enhance the
SU interactions over channels, for enhancing throughput of SU communities. The social behaviors are
compared with a baseline behavior, in which no social deference or avoidance takes place. That is the
SUs are fixed on the channels and always transmit on the allocated channels. The proposed behaviors
are: (1) The social deference, in which SUs altruistically defer transmission for the SUs within their
group, and (2) The social avoidance, in which SUs cautiously avoid transmission on channels that have
large number of SUs out of their group. The former behavior shines on overcrowded channels, while the
latter shines on channels that have relatively noticeable difference on the available channel capacities.
The difference in th channels capacities either comes from the channel condition or from the distribution
of the SUs when they follow the social avoidance behavior and their demand. For better performance,
the two proposed behaviors can be combined to achieve better throughput for the SUs community.
An ns-3 Simulation framework demonstrated that throughput improvement up to 134.4% with average
improvement of 54.1% with different values of social and deference thresholds for large SUs communities
with high demand.
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Introduction
Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) is a recent paradigm in wireless communications, in which spectrum
channels are allocated dynamically for users to combat spectrum scarcity. The research in DSA addresses
a set of challenges including spectrum management, spectrum sharing, spectrum mobility, and spectrum
sensing [33], [2].
The most widely adopted model for DSA is the Opportunistic Spectrum Access (OSA) [94]. In this
model, the licensed Primary User (PU) and the unlicensed Secondary Users (SUs) have mutual access
on the spectrum. SUs detect the presence of PUs [34], and access the spectrum when the PUs are
absent (i.e., detecting white space). Different approaches are followed to address the PU-SU and SUSU interactions including: (a) game-theoretic [49][50][52][53] (b) machine learning [40][41][42] and (c)
biologically or socially inspired approaches [47] [46] [23]. This work addresses the SU-SU interactions for
spectrum access using bio-socially approach.
Cognitive Radio (CR) is a set of enabling technologies dedicated for the implementation of selforganizing networks and DSA networks [4]. Here we anticipate that the CR spectrum sensing technologies, can be combined with social sensing (i.e., awareness of the identity of peer SUs) to harmonize
SU-SU co-existence on the spectrum, and ensuring more effective spectrum sharing. This is important
since poor SUs interactions leads to unbalanced spectrum access, in which some channels are congested
and other channels are underutilized.
The following question is the central focus of this work: For a community of SUs, who are distributed over different groups, what is the recommended SU behaviors across channels that maximize the
community throughput and enhance the spectrum utilization?
Towards resolving the question, we introduce the following SU capabilities:
1. The SU is able to transmit on the channels as long as the PUs are absent, following the OSA model.
2. The SUs able to socially sense the channels, and understand social structure of the SUs on the
channel.
3. The SU has the tendency to avoid transmission over channels that has presumably a large number
of SUs belonging to groups other than its own group. The avoidance also serves as the SU response
to the presence of the PUs on the channel.
4. The SU has the tendency to defer transmission over channels that has presumably a large number
of SUs belonging to its own group.
The first and second capabilities provide the SUs with the channel and social sensing, respectively.
The social out-of-group avoidance capability helps to distribute the SUs belonging to different groups
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Figure 18: Research gap with respect to the DSA/CR literature.
over channels. This is anticipated to enhance the fairness among groups across channels, in which SUs
from different groups will likely to experience the same level of channel conditions. Social segregation
might arise in cases where some groups has a little tendency to avoid transmission and others have more
tendency to avoid transmission on that channel. The social in-group deference capability allow SUs to
act altruistically on the channels that have excessive demand. In this case, SUs sacrifice some of their
time to defer to other co-SUs to help them gain more utility on the channel. A starvation avoidance
technique is employed to avoid deteriorating utilities of the deferring SUs.
Through ns-3 Simulation, the proposed bio-socially inspired behaviors demonstrated throughput improvement up to 134.4% with average improvement of 54.1% in scenarios where large SUs communities
have high demand on channels, under different tendencies of social avoidance and deference.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Prior work is discussed in Section 5. Section 5
introduces the system model. Section IV presents two use cases for the propsed behaviors. The results
of simulation studies and formal analysis of the system dynamics are presented in Sections 5 and 5,
respectively. Section 5 introduces an experimental testbed for future experimental research directions.
Finally, conclusion and future directions are discussed in Section 5.

Prior Related Work
Previous work in CR focuses on PU-SU dynamics (e.g. [5] and others), ignoring SU-SU interactions
over resources. This point is recently addressed in the work of Dixit et al. [8] and Xing et al. [9], and the
work of Wisniewska et al. [10] [11] [12][13]. Our work here also serves to elucidate the nature of SU-SU
dynamics and extends the work of Shattal et al. [14] [15]. The work utilizes the findings in the work of
Dombrowski et al. [16] for hierarchical resource sharing in the Inuit community in Labrador, Canada.
Research into PU-SU and SU-SU interactions can be classified into three main categories: (a) machine
learning formulations, (b) game-theoretic approaches, and (c) biologically or socially inspired schemes.
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The results presented here serve to address the role of SU interactions towards the enhancement of DSA
systems. This research gap is illustrated in Figure 18 relative to the recent DSA/CR research, briefly
explained next.
Machine learning approaches have been applied extensively for spectrum allocation and spectrum
sharing, using various support vector machine techniques [95], for spectrum sensing using Q-learning
[96] in comparison with other HMM model techniques, and for security in cognitive radio networks [97].
Different types of machine learning algorithms are applied into CR network protocols ( see [43] for a
survey). The problem associated with machine learning approaches, is that the SU doesn’t have access
to updated, correct action that is best fit for the current DSA environment. Example of this is the
reinforcement learning approaches, where decision making depends on an evaluative feedback for a trial
and error process, as discussed in the survey [43].
Game theory approaches have been used in CR domain as a mathematical tool to analyze and model
the CR networks as a common form games (see [49] and [50] for a survey of prior work). For example,
SUs over competition over channels has been modeled as a non-cooperative game [98]. Unfortunately,
most game-theoretic research relies on the availability of spectrum statistics in order to formulate the
game and cope with spectrum dynamic changes, especially in stochastic [52] and repeated games [53].
Such information is not known a priori, limiting the applicability of this approach [54].
Biologically or socially inspired incorporate social components to users’ behavioral models (e.g.,
preferential bias [17], peer recommendations [18], and selfishness [19]). These approaches treat the CR
ecosystem as a social network [44] [45] for which cooperative schemes are designed [22]. Such approaches
follow the optimization resulting from the evolution of the biological systems, and apply the of biological
natural selection process to the CR Networks domain. Behavioral models of biological and social systems
were used for resource allocation problems, including MANET routing [46], Vehicular Network (VANET)
routing [47], and sensor network management [21]. In the context of CR, bio-socially inspired models have
been developed for spectrum sensing [21], channel selection [22], and efficient routing [46]. Unfortunately,
idealized bio-social models based on animal societies (e.g., termites [48], ants [26], etc.) require a level
of coordination among population individuals [27].
Priority among SUs groups in CR Networks (CRNs) were studied based on social approach. The
work of Ezirim et al. [99], proposed a deference structure among “networks” to support an altruistic
behavior in social coalition. This helps CRNs to minimize the chances of conflict over homogeneous
channels. The proposed model consider the CR from network perspective, in which networks, not the
SUs, forms the coalition to interact over resources. In our approach, CRN is divided into social groups.
Each SU defers or avoids transmission on channels based on his group membership. There is no groupwise decision involved in the deference, avoidance or transmission decisions. The work of Kedun et al.
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Figure 19: The Finite State Machine for the secondary users in the system.
[100] proposed a single channel and multi-channels CR systems. Both analyzed based on preemptive
and non-preemptive priority queuing approaches. From social point of view th work can be considered
as an example of studying greedy SUs interactions over channels. Our approach addresses the priority
over channels based on social relations among SUs within different groups. The grouping can be tackled
based on SUs’ transmission rate, sensitivity to delay or channel conditions and/or pure social relations
among SUs. This point is further explained in the use cases section (see Section 5).
A similar work to ours, is the work of Xing et al. [101]. Their work addresses the SUs interaction
under two constraints: the QoS and the interference temperature. The work formulates the problem
as an optimization problem by maximizing the utility of SUs. SUs are divided into groups based on
their priority. The model forms a potential game to address the priority among SUs. Regarding social
deference, priority model in Xing’s work can be considered as social deference among SUs on a single
channel. However, this is needed to be re-formulated for multi-channel systems in which SUs with more
priority have more incentives to access better channels, which empowers the role of social avoidance. Our
work addresses mutli-channel bio-socially inspired CR systems.

System Model
In what follows, we assume a community of N SUs. Each SU Sj seeks to transmit data at a rate Rj
bits/s: j = 1 . . . N . The community of SUs is distributed over a set of z groups: G = {g1 , g2 , . . . , gz }.
SUs operate within an ecosystem of M spectrum channels, and follows the FSM depicted in Figure 19.
Each channel Bi (i = 1 . . . M ) has a capacity Ci bit/s, and a fraction αi ∈ [0, 1] of the overall channel
capacity that is available for SUs transmission. When αi = 0, a PU is present and SUs are not permitted
to transmit; when αi = 1, all SUs who are tuned to channel Bi may transmit each at rate Rj .
Initially, Sj is in Transmit substate and transmits on channel i. Based on the deference probability
qj , it may defer to other SUs from its own group. We define: Uj,i,z as a set of all SUs belong to group gz
and transmitting on channel Bi as seen by the secondary user Sj . Then, the total number of SUs seen
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by Si is defined as:
Nj,i =

X

||Uj,i,z ||

(1)

z

Within Uj,i,z , the number of SUs that are in Sj ’s group z is:

Nj,i,z =

X

||Uj,i,s : Sj ∈ gz ||

(2)

s

and the probability of deference for Sj on channel Bi is:

qj,i =

Nj,i,z
Nj,i

(3)

Notice that at any point of time, qj,i = 0 for all channels other than the Sj ’s current channel Bi . Sj
defers only when qj,i exceeds the deference threshold β. for large values of β, Sj is less likely to defer to
other SUs and tends to act selfishly on the channel, and vice versa.
When deferring, the SU stops transmission on the channel and stay tuned on the same channel. To
avoid starvation, a probability of hunger rH is introduced for the SU. rH is proportional to the huger
level H which is limited by the maximum allowable hunger level Hmax . If the SU reaches Hmax , SU
stops acting altruistically and start transmitting on the channel.
Regardless of the SU being in the Defer sub-state or in the Transmit sub-state, the SU avoids
transmission on channels that has large number of SUs from other groups, based on the probability of
the avoidance pj,i . to define pj,i , we have the number of SUs that are not in Sj ’s group z as:

Nj,i,−z =

X

||Uj,i,s : Sj ∈
/ gz ||

(4)

s

and the probability of avoidance for Sj on channel Bi is:

pj,i =

Nj,i,−z
Nj,i

(5)

Sj avoids transmission on the channel only when Pj,i exceeds the avoidance threshold α. For large
values of α, Sj has less tendency to leave the channel for other groups. In the avoidance, SU tunes to
a another channel, that is randomly chosen from the set of channels. The social avoidance is associated
with a switching cost Sc that is compensated by switching to less congested channels.
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Use Cases and Applications
In this section, two real-world scenarios are introduced to address the applicability of the proposed
strategies.

Hierarchical SUs DSA Systems
The principle of OSA among SUs and PUs can be extended to include hierarchical DSA among SUs.
An example of this approach is the model introduced by Federated Wireless [102], for Spectrum Access
System (SAS) of three levels of Spectrum Access. In the first level is the incumbent Users representing
Military and other users who allocate the spectrum as they need (i.e., the PU). The second level represents
the commercial users who are provided with prioritized access. The third level represents the general
users, who can benefit from the spectrum, while guaranteeing spectrum access for the two former types
of users. Our work can is aligned with this model, in which SUs forms two groups of SUs that access
channels based on their social avoidance tendency. Priority access can be studied by providing SUs in the
two groups with different social avoidance threshold α, to balance the co-existence of SUs from different
groups on the channels, based on their priority.

Mice and Elephant transmission
The concept of mice and elephants was used in the context of TCP/IP networks to distinguish
between two levels of IP connections: connection with large demand (i.e., elephants) and connections
with lower demand (i.e., mice). The work in [103] claims that majority (e.g., 80%) of the Internet
connections are mice and the rest are elephants. Elephants are likely to win the competition against
mice since they can reflect from details of connections. Recently, Chai et al. [104], employed this concept
in support of Cloud-Radio Access Network (RAN), by dividing each elephant connection into multiple
mice connections.
We can employ the concept of mice and elephants, by allowing different transmission rates for different
users. Two groups of SUs can be modeled based on their demand on the channels, with different social
avoidance thresholds. One example of this approach can be spectrum access for multimedia and IoT
applications. In general, multimedia is throughput hungry applications in which we expect less number
of multimedia users are accessing the channels. On another hand, IoT applications generate data from
large number of users, each has little data to be transmitted. In this model, SUs not only able to avoid
transmission based on the other SUs identities on the channels, but also this decision can be combined
with the estimation of demand on the channels. This carried out by SUs since they know their group
type (e.g., mice or elephants) and also the other group type. This might lead to combined channel and
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social aware DSA approach.

Simulation Performance Analysis
In our simulation model, N SUs access M different WLAN 802.11g channels in infrastructure mode,
in which SUs of each band are managed by an Access Point (AP). SUs are free to switch among channels
via associating with different APs. Initially, each SU load its avoidance list and deference list and start
consuming on its pre-designated band.

Simulation Setup
Network Setup: To simulate M = 5 different bands in WLAN network, We setup M Access points
(AP) that manage traffic of the network segments (i.e. wireless channel) in infrastructure mode. We
setup N different nodes each equipped with M WiFi devices. Each device is connected to different AP.
When nodes decide to switch from one band to another band it turn off the current device and turn
on the device corresponds to the intended band and associate with the new AP. The transmission is a
unicast UDP traffic generated from the nodes and sent to the AP. When device decides to defer to other
nodes in the channel it stop its own UDP application.
The Social Deference Behavior: In order to simulate the deference behavior using ns-3, we
can install an IP application (either UDP or TCP) and then schedule the start time and stop time
the application on given node.In this case, stopping the application simulates the deference behavior.
Deference behavior happens asynchronously for nodes. Every nodes determines its Deference Time Td
independently based on values of β and γ.
The Social Avoidance Behavior: The avoidance behavior takes place, when the SU decides to
switch from the current channel to another channel when it realizes that there is a large number of SUs,
with respect to α, from the other groups. The cost of channel switching is networks/system dependent.
In our simulation framework, SUs switch channels by associating from the current interface on the AP
and associating with the new interface on the AP. Despise the fact that this operation is costly, the
system shows throughput improvement due to the avoidance behavior. Other systems have different cost
of switching based on there operations, since the channel switching involves hardware and/or software
reconfiguration for different wireless devices.
Determining the Hunger Level: If SUs are transmitting with a constant rate R, then the hunger
level can be determined based on the waiting time that SU spent without transmission. the hunger level
is a function of the demand of SU, in which it accumulate data in its buffer to transmit. Also, the hunger
level should be determined in the forage state and not in the consume state. Furthermore, the hunger
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Table 9: System Parameters

Constants

Input Parameters

Calculated Parameters
Output Parameters

Symbol
M
N
Ci
Ri
θ1
θ2
θ3
α
β
γ
Γ(.)

Parameter
Number of channels
Number of SUs
Channel capacity
SU transmission rate
Avoidance Threshold
Deference Threshold
Hunger Level Threshold
Avoidance probability
Deference probability
Relative Hunger level
SU fractional throughput

Value/Range
4
40 per channel
[1, 1, 2, 2] Mbps, respectively
varies in [10, 25, 40] Kbps
varies in [0, 1]
varies in [0, 1]
varies in [0, 1]
varies in [0, 1]
varies in [0, 1]
varies in [0, 1]
[0,1]

level affect the probability of which the SU will avoid/defer to other SUs on the channel. The hunger
level should be determined in timely manner, such that each SU recalculate its own hunger level every
step of time.
Sniffing the MAC Headers: In ns-3, access to the MAC Frames on the channel by enabling
Promiscuous Mode on the devices in ns3::NetDevice::SetPromiscReceiveCallback( PromiscReceiveCallback cb). This helps the devices to pass all packets, from all sources to all destinations, to the upper
network layers as seen by the device. An event handler should be setup and wired to the callback of
each received packet in Promiscuous mode. MAC headers, then, can be classified and added to the corresponding queue. Notice that the sniffing of the MAC frame is limited only for Data MAC frames that
associated with real data packets. Other management MAC frame are not sniffed using this callback.
The algorithm below describes the operations that is based on MAC Frames sniffing process. This
algorithm accept the users queues Q1 and Q2 and the current system time as an input parameters. It
update the queues to add new entries and remove old obsolete entries based on the system timer and
Time to Live TTL for entries of avoidance queue (T1 ) and TTL for entries in deference queue(T2 ). The
output of the algorithm is the hunger level H, the number of unique MAC addresses K from Q2 and α
and β, where α is the ratio of number of the mac address in Q1 to the max length for avoidance list B1 ,
and β number of the mac address in Q2 to the max length of defer list B2 . Notice that even that this
algorithm takes the system time as an input value, it is not synchronized with the system timer and it
is only prompted by the reception of MAC frames in promiscuous mode.
1:

Given: Q1 , Q2 , T1 , T2 , B1 , B2 , Ts

2:

while System is running do

3:

SniffMACHeaders()

4:

AddNewEntries(Q1 , Q2 , Ts )

5:

RemoveObselteEntries(Q1 , Q2 , T1 , T2 )
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6:

Calculate H, K, α, β, γ
The Core Logic: The core logic encapsulate all aspects of the proposed deference system. The

Algorithm 5 describe the operation done in user wise every C seconds. As a result the algorithm evaluate
the effect of the social deference behavior on the community utility in term of throughput perceived by
the nodes in the network. The algorithm combines all previously described parameters and the content
of the queues to determine the current state of the node.
1:

Given: Q1 , Q2 , B1 , T1 , B2 , B3 , T2 , R, θ1 , θ2 , θ3 , C, M

2:

while System is running do

3:
4:
5:

if C%Ts = 0 then
if In Transmit State then
if Q1 .SIZE == B1 and α > θ1 then

6:

BoI = ChooseABand(M, α, θ1 )

7:

if BoI != Current Band then

8:

SwitchToBand( BoI )

9:

SendData(R, BoI)

10:

else
if Q2 .SIZE == B2 and β > θ2 then

11:
12:

BoI = Current Band

13:

DeferTransmission(H, BoI)
else

14:

SendData(R, BoI)

15:
16:
17:
18:

else
if In Defer State then
if γ > θ3 then

19:

BoI = Current Band

20:

SendData(R, BoI)

21:
22:

else
DeferTransmission(H, BoI)

Mainly, the node either transmit or stop transmission on the channels, due to avoidance or deference.
The system wise throughput is used a metric to evaluate the feasibility of implementing the deference
and avoidance social behaviors and conditions of their application.
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Figure 20: Effect of social avoidance for SUs with lower demand on channels.

Figure 21: Effect of social avoidance for SUs with medium demand on channels.

Simulation Results
To study the feasibility of employing the social avoidance behavior in the CR networks, a set of
simulation experiments are setup, with 40 SUs transmitting on 4 channels. The SUs are distributed
equally between two groups, with different social avoidance thresholds α1 , α2 , and social deference
thresholds β1 and β2 for groups 1 and 2, respectively. SUs transmit at the same rate: 10, 25, and 40
Kbps, as shown in Figures (20), (21), and (22). In these experiments, the effect of social deference is
neutralized by setting the social deference threshold values , β1 and β2 equals 1. In this case, SUs does
not defer to each other, and only left with two choices: either to transmit on the current channel or to
switch to a different channel and transmit on the new channel.
Referring to Figure (20), the Social avoidance show lower performance in comparison to the baseline
case (i.e., α1 = α2 = 1), in which, no social avoidance is established. This is understood from the fact
that the social avoidance is associated with switching overhead accumulating while SUs are avoiding SUs
from the other group on the channel. Since the channels are already underutilized, the social avoidance
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Figure 22: Effect of social avoidance for SUs with high demand on channels.
shows redundant behavior, leaving the baseline case with better performance.
In contrast, social behavior shows better performance when the demand on the channels is medium
(25 Kbps per SU) as shown results in Figure (21). The 1 Mbps channels are near capacity and the
2 Mbps are relaxed. The overhead of channel switching, in this case, is compensated since the SUs
are switching to channels with better residual channel capacity (e.g., channels 3 and 4). The baseline
behavior, shows lower performance since SUs are fixed on the channels, and are not able to benefit from
the 2 Mbps channels. Aggressive avoidance also leads to lower performance, (e.g., α1 = α2 = 0.1), due
to the overhead of the social avoidance.
The social avoidance has no benefits under congested channels. As in Figure (22), SUs transmit at
40 Kbps, and demand on the channels exceeds the the channel capacities. The social avoidance has no
advantage since the SUs waste the time switching among channels that are already crowded. In general,
the social avoidance can be advantageous, in cases where the avoidance overhead can be compensated
by allocating channels with better conditions (e.g., residual channel capacities).
The effect of combined social avoidance and deference behaviors: In the next experiments,
we vary the social avoidance and deference thresholds for the two groups in the community together.
Both groups have the same thresholds for avoidance and deference. We experiment with communities
of 50, 150, and 250 SUs, respectively, over 5 channels. Again the community is divided between the
two groups and data transmission occur only within the same group. The experiments are repeated
for different transmission rates to address the effect of contention level on the community throughput.
Results for 50 SUs community is illustrated in Figure (23). In these we notice that the base line behavior
(i.e., no social avoidance or deference), is preferable over any combination of the social behaviors in
the system. The difference between maximum and minimum throughput start to decrease as the SU
rate changes from 10 to 75 to 125 Kbps for Figure (23) (a), (b), and (c), respectively. Notice that also
the sudden throughput change for avoidance thresholds (α > 0.5), which refelct the actual division of
the SUs on the community among the two groups. This implies that below this threshold values, the
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avoidance provide redundant social behavior. Furthermore, the throughput is sensitive to the deference
avoidance as seen in Figure (23) (a)-(c). Aggressive deference leads to underutilization of the channels
since it prevents the SUs to transmit on channels (e.g., shaded areas for β = 0.4 and below).
For 150 SUs community, almost the same load generated in the 50 SUs community in Figure (23)
(a)-(c), is generated for 150 SUs community, in Figure (24) (a)-(c), respectively. However, different
throughput patterns of the throughput is noticed for this case, especially in Figure (24) (b)-(c). In
this case, this is due to the fact that the number SUs in this case is larger, and SUs start experiencing
different avoidance behaviors over the set of channels. Notice that the social deference in the 150 SUs
community demonstrate better performance, in comparison with the 50 SUs in which it shows poor
performance. (e.g., α = 0.1, β = 0.9) in Figure (23) (a) vs. in Figure (24)). Similar conclusion can
be seen comparing (23) (b)-(c) with (24) (b)-(c), respectively, in which social deference becomes more
preferable. The baseline performance still be the most beneficial behavior for the whole community and
preferred over any other social behaviors in cases of lower and medium load channels (Figure 24 (a)-(b)).
The baseline is beneficial under high load on channels, in which combined social avoidance-deference
demonstrate better throughput for the community.
The experiments are repeated for 250 SUs community. The role of social deference and avoidance
becomes more crucial and demonstrated better performance for the SUs on the community. This is
due to the fact that the altruistic social deference helps to decrease the contention over channels and
allow the community of SUs to gain better throughput. The social avoidance and deference behaviors
demonstrated, in this experiment, throughput improvement up to 134.4% with average improvement of
54.1% with different values of social and deference thresholds. Failing to follow the social avoidance
and deference decreases the SUs’ throughout as seen in Figure (25) (b)-(c), for the baseline values
(α = 1.0, β = 1.0). Notice that if the channels are lightly loaded, the baseline behavior is still preferred
as in (25) (a), drawing the same conclusion for 50 SUs, and 150 SUs communities, (23) (a) and (24) (a),
respectively.

Formal Performance Analysis
In what follows, we assume that the SU switches from the current channel to one of its two adjacent
channels. This assumption is valid for small number of channels, since all states are accessible by the
SU, and the the probability of moving to adjacent channel is approximately equal to the probability
of hopping randomly between channels. For example, in a eco-system of 3 channels, the probability of
moving from the current channel to other adjacent channel equals to
among channels equals to

1
N −1

1
2.

The probability of hopping

= 12 , which is equal to the probability of switching to adjacent channels.
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(a) 50 SUs, 10Kbps per SU

(b) 50 SUs, 75Kbps per SU

(c) 50 SUs, 125Kbps per SU

Figure 23: Combined Social Avoidance and Deference effect on the community throughput (50 SUs).
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(a) 150 SUs, 3.3Kbps per SU

(b) 150 SUs, 25Kbps per SU

(c) 150 SUs, 42Kbps per SU

Figure 24: Combined Social Avoidance and Deference effect on the community throughput (150 SUs).
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(a) 250 SUs, 2Kbps per SU

(b) 250 SUs, 15Kbps per SU

(c) 250 SUs, 25Kbps per SU

Figure 25: Combined Social Avoidance and Deference effect on the community throughput (250 SUs).
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for large number of channels, this assumption is invalid, and the analysis should be carried for N N 2−1
equations.
Applying this assumption, and following the analysis of the FSM in Figure 18, we have:

πT,i · qj,i = πD,i · rH,i

(6)

Where πT,i and πD,i are the probability that Sj is transmitting on the channel i, and deferring transmission, respectively.
We are specially interested in πT,i since it governs the transmission on the channels and consequently,
affects the throughput obtained by the SU. Then:

πT,i = πD,i

rH,i
qj,i

(7)

Furthermore, we have:
πi−1 · pj,i−1 = πi · pj,i

(8)

Where πi is the probability that the SU is in state i. While in this state it is either deferring, or
transmitting. Applying for the kth state:

πk · pj,k = πk+1 · pj,k+1

(9)

Arranging equation (9) to obtain the probability of being in kth state, iteratively, from the 1st state, we
have:
πk = π1 ·

k−1
Y
i=1

pj,i
pj,i+1

(10)

The probability that the SU is transmitting on channel i:

PT,i = πi · πT,i

(11)

and also, we have:
N
X

πi = 1

(12)

i=1

From equations (10) and (12), we have:

π1 ·

N i−1
X
Y

pj,m

i=1 m=1

pj,m+1

1
π1 = PN Qi−1
i=1

=1

pj,m
m=1 pj,m+1

(13)
(14)

99

Figure 26: Experimental testbed for social avoidance and deference scheme.
The Si transmits on channel i at rate:
Rj,i = PT,i · Rj

(15)

and the total demand on the channel i:
Di =

N
X

Rj,i

(16)

j=1

Experimental Results
In this section, a testbed is presented to experiment with channel switching and strategy evolution
in Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). The testbed design and implementation are described next,
followed by experimental results and discussions.

Experimental Testbed
The experimental testbed is designed as an extension of the simulation framework to evaluate the
proposed model on the physical channels. Due to the reconfigurability and cost of implementing network
with large number of devices, one machine can be used to emulated large number of nodes while allowing
nodes to transmit traffic over the WiFi channels. In this case, all emulated nodes experience the same
level of contention over the channels and allow the behaviors of social deference and avoidance to be
studied across the allocated channels.
In this model, packets from ns-3 nodes from one machine are directed to their corresponding nodes
on the other machine through the physical WiFi channels. ns-3 nodes are connected to the physical
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machine through software tap-bridge, installed on the host Ubuntu platform. The machine redirects
packets from tap-bridge to the WiFi device, which sends it over air for physical transmission.
Each band in the simulation part, which represented by an AP, is connected to a given tap-bridge.
Five different WiFi devices (Netgear WNA1100 USB wireless adapters) are connected to the machine
using USB HUB, the devices should be able to support Atheros WiFi device driver for its known flexibility
and reconfigurability. This driver is especially used since it supports disabling the backoff, which is needed
for the experiment. This model is re-utilized from the work of Vanhoef [63] which used originally for
security purposes.
When SU decides to transmit on a given channel, it sends its packet to the corresponding AP. When
it decides to switch to another channel it dissociates from that AP and associates with the new AP. Each
simulated AP traffic is directed to different physical channels as depicted in Figure 26.
To maintain a persistent level of traffic on the channels, PU Tx-Rx pair is setup. In this setup five
Atheros devices are connected to both the PU-Tx and PU-Rx and the backoff setting, for these devices,
is disabled to allocate the needed level of PU traffic.
The experiment manager machine is responsible for experiment initiation and monitoring in timely
manner. This machine sends the configuration for all other machines through the Ethernet switch.
This is needed to isolate the management traffic among machines from the real traffic generated by
the experiments. At the end of experiments, results gathered in the SUs-Rx machine are sent to the
experiment manager for further analysis. For traffic logging during the experiments, experiment manager
sniffs all channels and logs the data using Wireshark. The hardware used in the experiments:
• 5 Dekstop Machines: Intel® Xeon (R) CPU E3-1240 v5 @ 3.50GHz × 8 with 64GB of RAM.
• 5 USB Hubs.
• 25 WiFi Devices: Netgear WNA1100 USB adapters with Atheros AR9002U/AR9271 Chipset.
• 1 1000Mbps Ethernet Switch.
• 5 1000Mbps Ethernet Cables.
The platforms and applications used in the experiments:
• Ubuntu Linux Operating System for hosting the SUs traffic.
• network simulator 3 (ns-3) for generating and receiving SUs data.
• Python programming language for logging, data analysis and visualization.
• ModWiFi Device Driver [63] for modifying the appropriate WiFi settings.
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Conclusion
In this work, two bio-socially behavior were introduced and compared with baseline approach for SUs
transmission across the available channels. The proposed behaviors shows improvement under conditions
where channels are highly loaded with large SUs community. Future work can be extended to address
different properties of SUs, different number of groups, different SUs demand level. More social behaviors
can be introduced and studied in similar manner. These properties can be studied using the simulation
framework and the experimental testbed introduced in this work.
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Chapter 6

Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter concludes the current work and points the future directions of the research.

Conclusions
The main conclusions that can be drawn from this work are:
• In this work we presented three bio-socially inspired strategies for DSA by secondary users. We
demonstrated through simulation experiments that each of these strategies has the potential to
dominate the others over long time scales where natural selection is at play.
• We showed that the winning strategy depends on the underlying channel conditions and the demographics of the SUs. ACUs emerge when the channel capacities are homogeneous and under light
load; FCUs emerge when the channels capacities are heterogeneous and under intermediate load;
SFCUs emerge when the channels capacities are heterogeneous and under heavy load.
• We proved analytically that each strategy has a potential to win or lose in a system of SUs, based
on the condition of the channels utilized and social attributes of the users. Given channel conditions
and users’ behaviors, SUs evolve to one and only one strategy that is considered evolutionary stable.
• We showed analytically that no mixed strategies yield a stable strategy for the system. Furthermore,
we showed that, under some conditions, SUs with more social tendency gain more benefits on the
long run when compared with selfish SUs, who prefer myopic, short-term benefits.
• The advent of large-scale VANETs heralds the emergent problems of device co-existence and the
potential of device sociality in the ecosystem of the radio spectrum.
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• We found that for Vehicular Networks, one of these three strategies is always dominant, and while
the winning strategy depends on channel conditions, it is stable against defections by small numbers
of deviating nodes.
• Taken together, these results together point to a new way of thinking about resource allocation
problem: one where optimal and stable channel selection strategies are computed and uniformly
recommended, rather than the current view where individual channels are micromanaged and
allocated by a central authority.
• This new model is envisioned at the core of a VANET communications system, where a road-side
unit aggregates and relays per-band throughput measurements from its area nodes to the cloud.

Future Work
This work can be extended to the following research directions:
• The proposed analytical framework, can be extended to study new strategies that exhibit a distinct
social and cognitive behaviors, depending on observed community of SUs and network metrics.
Future work includes, but not limited to, applying the proposed strategies in different use cases
such as EHS, IoT, and VANETs.
• Implementation of VANET hardware testbed, based on the proposed bio-socially inspired DSA
systems is planned, to complement and validate the analytic and simulation findings presented
here.
• The dynamic optimization of node-specific parameters, and a fine-grained analysis of control traffic
overhead is planned for future research.
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